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Abstract 
 
The study of U.S diplomatic history and the Cold War has undergone a marked 
transformation in the analytical methods, conceptual approaches, and theories used by 
practitioners in the field. However, innovation and sophistication has seldom transferred into 
the study of the historiographical literature itself. In an attempt to buck this trend, this 
dissertation posits a theory of historiographical development in order to interrogate the 
meaning of the orthodox-revisionist debate on the origins of the Cold War. Borrowing 
insights from the literature on ‘critical historiography’, it suggests that historiographical shifts 
occur in the twin struggle of defining the boundaries of the historical field and the 
construction of U.S identity. It documents the process of ‘disciplinisation’ that Cold War 
revisionism underwent, reconfiguring both the parameters of the field and the form of 
revisionist interpretations. It moves on to suggest that legitimation of revisionism as a form of 
historical knowledge was facilitated by conceptual shifts in the meaning of U.S identity and a 
rearticulation of the orthodox narrative, which incorporated and thereby marginalised the 
revisionist critique. Finally, a few thoughts are raised as to the politicised nature of all 
historiography in the way that it negotiates challenges to disciplinary practices and 
boundaries. 
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Introduction 
I. The Origins of the Cold War: An Overview 
The story of Cold War historiography was once a simple one to tell. First, there was the 
traditionalist or orthodox thesis, which formed the standard interpretation between the 1940s 
and the early-1960s.1 Orthodox historians argued that the Cold War started because of the 
Soviet Union’s decision to embark upon an expansionist policy in Eastern Europe and 
elsewhere, which was driven by the ideological goal of exporting world revolution. Proof of 
Moscow’s intentions could be found in Soviet unilateral moves to install communist or pro-
communist governments in Eastern Europe, efforts to destabilise governments in the Near 
East and the return to doctrinal belligerence by Russian leaders.2 
In contrast, the United States was seen as largely passive and defensive in its approach 
to the problems of the immediate post-war period, having few specific aims other than to 
encourage an international order based on freedom, self-determination and adherence to the 
rule of law.3 By 1947 U.S leaders finally realised the futility of such aims, given the innate 
hostility of the Soviet Union and settled upon a policy of “containing” Russian expansionism. 
The central theme in much of traditionalist historiography was an ideological one: the United 
States, confronted by an implacably hostile foe for which no amount of Western conciliation 
would satisfy its global ambitions, came to the defence of freedom and democracy, saving the 
world from the spread of communist rule.4 
The mid-to-late ‘sixties’ witnessed the emergence of another school to rival 
orthodoxy, namely ‘revisionism’.5 Where orthodox scholars saw U.S foreign policy as 
virtuous, benevolent and essentially benign, revisionist historians observed purpose, design 
and the consistent pursuit of national self-interest. Where traditionalists interpreted Soviet 
actions as part of an overall blueprint for global domination, the revisionists saw security fears 
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at the heart of Soviet policy. Having turned orthodoxy on its head, revisionists concluded that 
the United States was chiefly responsible for the onset of Cold War.  
Broad assent on U.S responsibility has often obscured the fact that revisionism was a 
heterogeneous body of scholarship. Notwithstanding the attempts of anti-revisionist critics to 
portray them as a single monolithic interpretation, Cold War revisionism combined the 
writings of William Appleman Williams and his followers on the ‘Open Door Empire’, Gar 
Alperovitz’s work on atomic diplomacy and Gabriel Kolko’s survey of the capitalist system 
and U.S foreign relations.6 They were part of a resurgence of the historiographical left in 
America that was associated with the “New Left” movement, though the relationship between 
these diplomatic historians and radical politics was ambiguous.7 
During the 1960s and 1970s, the debate over the origins of the Cold War between 
traditionalists and revisionists was exceedingly hostile and vituperative. Peter Novick 
observes that “what made the controversy so highly charged were the implicit questions it 
raised, which had to do with nothing less than the United States’ moral standing in the 
world”.8 By charging the United States with responsibility for the Cold War, focusing on 
Washington’s own expansionist ambitions and rejecting Soviet depravity as a principal cause 
of the conflict, revisionists subverted not only the clear moral distinctions that had sanctioned 
U.S policy, but the very meaning of ‘America’ itself. The Cold War debate “was not just 
about what we should do, but about who we were”.9  
From the mid-1970s, the intensity of the controversy dissipated, paving the way for 
another reconsideration of the origins of the Cold War. The new synthesis that was heralded, 
called “post-revisionism”, claimed to have overcome the shortcomings of the existing 
orthodox and revisionist literature and avoided the unscholarly emphasis on blame-
throwing.10 Post-revisionist historians like John Lewis Gaddis postulated a less-clear cut 
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picture of events, where multiple intertwining factors entered into explanation. Nevertheless, 
one of the underlying themes of post-revisionism was geopolitical.  
Emphasis on the strategic dimensions of U.S policymaking, the fears, perceptions of 
threat and the definition of vital security interests became the hallmark of post-revisionist 
scholarship.11 Washington’s fears about the Soviet Union, in particular its ability to capitalise 
on the devastation wrought by the Second World War to spread its pernicious influence into 
the power vacuums left by the defeat of the Axis powers, were genuine. The threat posed to 
Western interests and institutions was real. Post-revisionist historians, to varying degrees, 
praised the wisdom of postwar U.S officials in restoring a global balance of power and 
forestalling the possibility of Moscow’s domination of Eurasia.12 
By the late 1980s, however, the division of Cold War historiography into 
traditionalism, revisionism, and post-revisionism, was no longer tenable. The arrival of new 
conceptual approaches, such as ‘corporatism’, ‘world systems’, and later ‘culture’ blurred the 
lines of separation between historical accounts. The diffusion of perspectives was accelerated 
by the end of the Cold War itself and the subsequent release of archive materials in the former 
communist bloc in the 1990s. Correspondingly, a ‘new’ Cold War history was proclaimed.13 
However, the new history did not constitute an interpretive ‘school’ so much as it meant the 
study of Cold War history that was truly international in scope (rather than simply an adjunct 
of U.S diplomatic history) and genuinely multifaceted in its approach to explanation. Odd 
Arne Westad states that the “new Cold War history is in its essence multiarchival in research 
and multipolar in analysis, and, in the cases of some of the best practitioners, multicultural in 
its ability to understand different and sometimes opposing mindsets”.14  
Contemporary Cold War historians have come a long way since the days when 
orthodox and revisionist historians did battle over the causes of the U.S.-Soviet confrontation 
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in books, articles and journal commentaries. In many respects, they were participants in the 
Cold War. Presently, the study of the Cold War is so broad, diffuse and eclectic that a 
historiographical dispute on a similar scale is almost unimaginable.15 No doubt that the 
passage of time and remoteness from events has aided historical perspective. If historical 
progress has surely been made, the same cannot be said of historiographical analysis in the 
field.  
 
II. Empiricist Historiography, Critical Historiography 
Historians have long-recognised the contemporaneity of all historical writing. Frederick 
Jackson Turner wrote in the 1890s that “[e]ach age tries to form its own conception of the 
past. Each age writes the history of the past anew with reference to the conditions uppermost 
in its own time”.16 The truism that each generation of historians are influenced by a ‘climate 
of opinion’ or ‘the spirit of the age’ is often repeated in historiographical surveys, though it is 
seldom captured with any degree of conceptual precision. In traditional or ‘empiricist’ 
overviews of historiography – that which constitutes the bulk of the historiographical 
literature – there is a curious absence of thinking on the production of historiographical 
meaning and its changes.17 
A case in point is the work published on Cold War historiography. Roughly, this 
literature can be divided into two groups: comprehensive overviews of the development of 
historical debate;18 and in-depth treatments of one or more Cold War ‘school’.19 Although 
there are differences of emphasis and approach, neither attempt to conceptualise the link 
between the historiographical ‘modes of interpretation’ employed and the broader context in 
which they are situated. The conventional formula is to represent the literature in a descriptive 
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manner, summarising the interpretive debate between competing schools or traditions and 
areas of contention.20  
The descriptive character of much Cold War historiography also coincides with a 
highly attenuated understanding of what comprises a ‘politicised’ history, which is framed in 
disparaging terms as charges of bias or ‘presentism’, i.e. reading present concerns into the 
past. This is certainly the case with early writings on the Cold War that are deemed to have 
lacked requisite impartiality because they followed closely changes in overall political trends. 
The British historian D. C. Watt argued that American debates on the Cold War were 
“essentially unhistorical” and a “form of pseudo-history”, which “tells us very little of the 
Cold War much of American intellectual history in the 1960s and 1970s”.  
There is profound reluctance, in empiricist accounts of historiography, to explore the 
role of the ‘non-empirical’; in other words, the choice of theory, methodology, and forms of 
representation, as well as the subjective and ideological connotations they entail. This can be 
attributed in part to the dominant assumptions of the historical discipline, which circumscribe 
the boundaries of the field. The observation of the discipline’s conventions and rules of 
evidence is simultaneously a legitimisation of history’s claims to scientific knowledge and 
objective truth; but the practice of historiography itself threatens this procedure. As Robert 
Berkhofer explains “if historiography is the history of history, then it undermines the 
authority of proper history through its historicization of all histories to their times and thus 
suggests their cultural and political arbitrariness”.21 
A recent alternative to conventional accounts is Steven Hurst’s US Cold War Foreign 
Policy, which situates the historical literature in an explicitly conceptualised framework. 
Eschewing descriptive concerns, Hurst’s primary focus is on the structural dimensions of the 
Cold War’s ‘key perspectives’, which comprise choices about levels of analysis (individual, 
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class, state, system) and explanatory factors (politics, economics, strategy, ideology, culture). 
According to Hurst, the “arguments about U.S. foreign policy is [sic] an argument about 
which combinations of actors, levels, and fields provide us with best explanation of that 
policy”.22 
Hurst’s study is an important addition to the literature on Cold War historiography 
because it breaks out of the constraints of traditional historiography to debate the form of 
explanation used by historians in constructing historical accounts. More intriguing perhaps, is 
the attempt to elaborate, albeit in somewhat circumscribed fashion, the connections between 
the explanatory framework and an ideological function.23 This is a promising departure, but in 
the book it is left inchoate. What is required is a more formal and exacting theorisation of the 
way in which historiography reinforces certain ‘political’ tendencies.  
Another suggestive proposal is advanced by Emily Rosenberg who observes that “all 
historical texts...are invariably structured representations that...both silence as well as reveal, 
encode as well as decode, assign voice and authority to some and deny it to others [emphasis 
in original]”. The structure and logic of textual representation, she adds, “need[s] to be 
interrogated, not merely assumed”.24 Rosenberg’s suggestions echo many of the ideas 
associated with the ‘linguistic turn’ or ‘theory’, which have infused historical studies in recent 
years. New theories of language, narrative and discourse have raised discomforting questions 
about history’s epistemic status, but they have also challenged any pretension to permanent 
truths, fixed meanings and objective standards. This means that historical interpretation is no 
longer about the meaning and truth of the past, but is rather an effect of linguistic and social 
practices in the present, which form the basis of our cultural and political universe. According 
to Hayden White, “‘[p]ure’ interpretation, the disinterested inquiry into anything whatsoever 
is unthinkable without the presupposition of the kind of activity which politics represents”.25 
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The notion of the inescapability of politics in the nebulous domain of culture is a 
general theoretical orientation shared by so-called ‘postmodernist’ scholars, who have 
influenced a growing body of ‘critical historiography’, which suggests that all forms of 
historical explanation are ideologically positioned whether historians profess impartiality or 
not.26 It involves a critique of the politics fostered by interpretation as well as the politics 
behind interpretation, that is, the presuppositions about the nature of man, society and culture, 
methodological postulates, and the tropes, emplotments and other narrative strategies 
embedded in textual representation.27 This practice goes against the grain of traditional 
historiographical thinking, but it greatly enriches the potential meanings of what constitutes 
the ‘politics of history’.28 Taking this as a starting point, we can begin to elaborate the 
conceptual approach to be pursued here. 
 
III. Power, Identity and the Politics of Cold War Historiography 
The ‘historical’ writings of French thinker Michel Foucault have been a seminal influence on 
the development of critical historiography.29 His central preoccupation, in what is often 
described as his ‘genealogical’ period, was to explain the integrated processes of 
‘power/knowledge’ that function to control and discipline modern societies, or what he 
termed a ‘regime of truth’; that is 
 
the types of discourses which it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances 
which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each is sanctioned; the 
techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those who are 
charged with saying what counts as true.30 
 
Understanding Foucault’s ‘problematic’ is instructive, for it enables us to conceive 
historiography not as simply a discourse about discrete events in the past, but as a discourse 
that produces and legitimises knowledge in the present, which supports, albeit obliquely, 
articulations of ideology and political interests. On this account, truth in history is not to be 
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found in the realm of the ‘past’. Rather, it is an ‘effect’ of the practices and rules of discourse, 
in which the production of truth is a dynamic process governed by the ‘interplay’ of multiple 
forms of power.31   
Starting from this perspective, we can identify at least two interrelated forms of power 
that condition the production of meaning in historiography. The first belongs to the discipline 
or sub-discipline proper. As a mode of discourse, history is involved in an ongoing struggle to 
control the boundaries of the field in order to define its meaning, which is a form of ‘politics’ 
internal to the discipline. This is what gives the discipline a degree of autonomy, whereby 
interpretive, conceptual or methodological shifts are not reducible to the impact of any single 
external development. The second can be said to belong to a more diffuse, though no less 
important, struggle for ‘hegemony’ in a given social or political order.32 Historiography in 
this sense is an intervention onto a ‘field of possibility’ or ‘discursive formation’ that limits 
the horizons of meaning within which discourse takes place. The contours of historiographical 
development can be understood as the outcome of mediations between these two realms, 
which together shape and reshape meaning and truth in historical discourse, though neither is 
reducible to the other. 
Having foregrounded the theoretical intent, the aim of this dissertation is to critique 
early Cold War historiography as a discourse prefigured by, on the one hand, the field of U.S. 
diplomatic history and, on the other hand, an American Cold War ‘framework of meaning’ 
constituted by representations of ideology and national identity. It is argued that the Cold War 
debate between orthodox, revisionist and post-revisionist historians was not simply a 
progressive endeavour towards the ‘truth’, where one interpretive thesis was replaced by 
another more plausible thesis. It was rather a much more contradictory and vagarious process 
emerging out of competing internal and external antagonisms, which challenged, resisted, or 
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otherwise modified the parameters of discourse, creating new configurations of meaning and 
truth in the Cold War.  
Chapter 1 focuses on the rules and practices of discourse in U.S. diplomatic history 
and the nature of disciplinary and institutional arrangements, which determine how the field 
operates as a system of knowledge. In this regard, primary emphasis is given to an analysis of 
the constitutive role that power has played in legitimising certain modes of interpretation as 
well as an examination of the ideological implications for historical writing. This chapter also 
elucidates the conceptual underpinnings of Cold War representations, which exerted a 
profound influence on American society and culture, and were inextricably bound up with the 
meaning and identity of the United States itself.  
Chapter 2 assesses the nature of Cold War orthodoxy’s hegemony during the 1940s 
and 1950s. It sees this as a product of the cultural and intellectual conditions of the time, 
which were highly conducive to a single homogenising interpretation. This is reflected in 
political, social and historical thought, which was part of a ‘culture of Cold War’. The alliance 
of scholarship and power and the close ties between government and intellectuals is also 
explored in this period. What it also shows is how orthodox historiography remained firmly 
entrenched within the dominant research paradigm of diplomatic history. Increasingly 
important here is the slippery concept of realism, around which a limited interpretive rival to 
the orthodox thesis emerged. 
Chapter 3 traces the development of Cold War revisionism beginning with an account 
of how latent tensions in the Cold War framework became visible over the decade of the 
1950s. As the dimensions of the Cold War mutated and the United States became embroiled 
in intractable conflicts in the Third World, these tensions turned into open wounds by the time 
of the Vietnam War. The parameters of the Cold War debate also shifted under the strain, 
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creating the conceptual possibilities for the radical critique of U.S. foreign policy and a 
revision of the historiography.  
Chapter 4 continues the examination of how revisionism emerged by examining the 
process of its assimilation into the discipline of U.S. diplomatic history. The purpose here is 
to analyse the nature of the revisionist challenge to the established discourse, how 
representatives of the existing research paradigm responded and where revisionism’s eventual 
incorporation reconfigured the boundaries of the field. Yet this ought to be seen as a two-way 
process. The acceptance of revisionism as a legitimate form of inquiry altered the intellectual 
trajectory that revisionist scholars would take. At one time excluded from the discourse, they 
became defenders of those boundaries.  
The last chapter and conclusion takes up the theme of the previous chapter about the 
incorporation of revisionism into the field in relation to revisionist (and their intellectual 
descendents) claims of a strategy of ‘containment’ by realist or neorealist scholars. It situates 
that contention within the disciplinary framework and asks whether the constraints and limits 
of the field have also acted to diffuse the radical emphasis of revisionist scholarship. 
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Chapter 1 
Conceptualising Cold War History: Between the Politics of Disciplinarity and Identity 
Formation 
PART A 
I. History and the ‘Ideology of Realism’ 
In the essay “The Politics of Historical Interpretation”, Hayden White assesses the 
transformation of historical studies into a properly disciplined form of inquiry in the 
nineteenth century.33 This original act of turning history into a professional activity was, 
according White, an inherently politicised move. History’s authority was established in its 
separation from speculative philosophy of history, which constituted a fundamental 
reorientation of the ontological status of the past along realist lines.34 The belief in the reality 
of the past and its objective recovery, via the protocols of empirical evidence, enabled the 
distinction between history and fiction to be drawn, based on the correspondence theory of 
truth. ‘Facts’ and description were treated as distinct from values and interpretation and 
objectivity was defined by the extent to which the latter could reliably account for the former. 
Thus, by this process of ‘disciplinisation’, history’s professional authority was legitimated.  
The theoretical foundations of historical inquiry, often described as ‘Rankean’, have 
been modified in the last one-hundred and fifty years or so, though it still exerts a profound 
influence over the field. Recently, doubts about history’s epistemological status have been 
raised by so-called ‘postmodern’ historians, who deny the possibility of representing the past 
“as it really was”. Dissolving the link between the past and the present, they argue that 
history, like other forms of cultural representation, have no privileged access to the truth. This 
claim has caused some consternation within the ranks of the historical profession, which is 
unsurprising since it undermines history’s authority. According to postmodernists, history’s 
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legitimacy is conferred by what Berkhofer calls the “ideology of realism”, where historians 
“assert their power over their readers in the name of reality”.35 Assuming the voice of an 
omniscient narrator, historians claim to speak on behalf of the past and what really happened. 
This is an exercise of disciplinary power, which obscures the ‘fictive’ dimensions of historical 
representation, i.e. its presumptions of models of human agency, standards of rationality, 
moral and ethical norms and modes of emplotting narratives. Postmodernists have also 
emphasised the political interests that are served by the uncritical assimilation of these 
postulates.36 To paraphrase White, the disciplinisation of history performs the ideological and 
social function of reinforcing the legitimacy of the nation-state – and one that it still performs 
today.37 
Having said that, whilst one can agree that all forms of historical explanation are 
freighted with ideological baggage, the disciplinary formation of knowledge is more 
internally complex and inconsistent than this (admittedly reductionist) portrayal allows and 
cannot be apprehended by seeing history as simply an oppressive venture. A more nuanced 
approach is suggested by an analysis of the internal dynamic and individual characteristics of 
the given sub-discipline. 
 
II. Diplomatic History as a Form of Imperial Knowledge 
The rise of diplomatic history to the front rank of professional historical scholarship 
under the patronage of Leopold von Ranke paralleled the consolidation of the modern nation-
state in Europe. In the United States, the development of diplomatic history followed a 
somewhat different path. Indeed, it was not until the interwar period that American diplomatic 
history became a full-fledged sub-field of the profession.38 This was due in no small measure 
to the nation’s chequered diplomatic record and its ambivalent relations with the outside 
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world.39 Despite this delay however, America’s early diplomatic historians remained wholly 
committed to the ‘Rankean’ tradition of historical studies. 
In the 1930s and 1940s, a ‘nationalist’ perspective developed amongst leading 
practitioners like Samuel Flagg Bemis, who “stressed the continuities in American 
diplomacy” and “celebrated the growth of American power”.40 Their main preoccupation was 
the study of state policy, in particular the causes and consequences of U.S. involvement in 
‘crisis events’ like wars and peace settlements. Consequently, they combined a focus on elite 
decision-makers with accounts based on ‘hard’ empirical evidence gleaned from documentary 
archives and tended to reflect a patriotic bias. 
In the early postwar period, the nationalist perspective gave way to a more pessimistic 
view of international politics and U.S. foreign policy associated with the doctrine of ‘realism’. 
Its emergence, announced by the publication of George Kennan’s classic American 
Diplomacy, 1900-1950, did not constitute a ‘paradigm shift’ so much as a more subtle 
variation on a traditional theme.41 Indeed the realist problematic, with its central focus on the 
state and realm of policymaking, was easily assimilated into existing practice. What it did was 
to propose a different standard by which to judge the success of foreign policy, as opposed to 
an alternative approach to historical interpretation.42 
Taking the state as the primacy unit of analysis, both nationalists and realists have 
reinforced certain interpretive assumptions whilst excluding others.43 Events are often seen as 
the accumulation of decisions by historical actors and interpretations are derived from a literal 
reading of the documents, where the reason given for action taken is assumed to be the 
explanation of those actions. Furthermore, foreign policy is conceived as distinct from the 
domestic sphere, where policymakers operate in a vacuum unaffected by ideological impulses 
or economic interests and few limits on human agency are considered to exist. 
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This form of explanation which is familiar to the realist paradigm reflects a particular 
social location that is coextensive with the state and political power. In other words, realist 
historians write inside the purview of the official perspective or policymaking 
‘Weltanschauung’. This proximity to power is a key component in understanding how the 
field has operated as a disciplined system of knowledge and the effects on interpretive 
outcomes and their ideological connotations. 
According to Foucault, power is conceived as something that is at once confining and 
enabling, whereby discourses that are sanctioned by power produce knowledge and at the 
same time regulate its production through norms and practices that are seen as self-evident.44 
Influenced by this Foucauldian viewpoint, scholars have argued that the types of knowledge 
and practices that are dominant in diplomatic history are those which draw their legitimacy 
from the discourse of U.S. foreign policy itself. Frank Costigliola declares “we tend in our 
writing to reinscribe, with little comment, the discourses of policymaking”.45 Similarly, in 
examining the “pronounced coincide of temperament” between policymakers and diplomatic 
historians, Patrick Finney observes that “the two groups share the same discursive field – the 
same assumptions structuring perception, the same textual and linguistic practices through 
which knowledge of the world is constructed”. They include: 
 
the suppression of epistemological uncertainty and ambivalence, the predilection for hard evidence and 
documentary proof, the preoccupation with 'realities' rather than representation, the premium placed on 
experience and expertise, the lauding of (masculine) rationality, realism and pragmatism.46 
 
Furthermore, to take them as self-evident, Finney writes, “yields the agenda to the objects of 
historical inquiry, and blinds us to other ways of analysing policymaking… [this] helps to 
explain why our interpretive debates so often entail merely elaborating or refining competing 
arguments that derive from the original rhetoric of policymakers themselves”.47 A case in 
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point is the continued use of the term ‘containment’ to describe U.S postwar foreign policy, 
which bears obvious ideological connotations.48 
The relation between realists and policymakers can also be observed in the 
institutional structures of the discipline. Michael Hunt has argued that realist historians are 
“policymakers’ naturally ally [sic] in academe, where they serve as spokesmen for or 
explicators of officials perspectives”.49 This willingness to genuflect the interests of the state 
is reciprocated through power relations that are interspersed in the system of patronage and 
publishing which operates inside the discipline. The work of realist historians continues to 
dominate much of the field; writing for a wider non-specialist audience, they enjoy privileged 
access to establishment journals like Foreign Affairs as well as other mainstream outlets.50 
Underlying the realist perspective is an undeclared ideological commitment to a 
mutually reinforcing view of, on the one hand, U.S. diplomatic history as field of knowledge 
and, on the other, the world and America’s place within it. Taking the foundational status of 
the state for granted circumscribes the boundaries of the field, which, at the same time, 
entrenches the authority of the American state and reinforces its attendant ideologies and 
identities. So by trying to “see like a state” from “the vantage point of a fictive national 
security adviser”, realist diplomatic historians have defended an intrinsically conservative 
position inside the field.  
Prominent theorists in international relations – where realism has had an even greater 
impact – have argued that states do not possess a fixed identity; to assume otherwise is to 
conceal a claim for hegemonic control over the field.51 David Campbell asserts that states are 
“paradoxical entities which do not possess prediscursive, stable identities”. As a result, they 
are “in permanent need of reproduction: with no ontological status apart from the many and 
varied practices that constitute their reality, states…are always in a process of becoming”.52 
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Foreign policy, alleges Campbell, is a pre-eminent example of a discursive practice that is 
engaged in the ‘reproduction’ of national identity. The same can also be said of diplomatic 
history (though the claim is less strong), a suggestion which underlines the politically 
contested nature of the venture. As Anders Stephanson has written: 
 What drives diplomatic history in the United States is political controversy. Without it, the field has no 
direction, no character, no shape or form, no vivacity. This central feature is ultimately grounded in the 
fact that any analysis of the relationship to the outside world puts into question the very identity of the 
United States as an entity and a project.53 
 
Yet American diplomatic history is also animated by its own internal antagonisms, conflicts 
and struggles that constitute its own ‘politics of disciplinisation’, which mediate how 
historians respond to external political developments or trends. Also important in this respect 
is the ‘subject position’ of the historian inside discourse.54 Under the auspices of the realist 
paradigm, the conceptual field of U.S. diplomatic history was narrowly defined, limiting the 
range of interpretive possibilities and ruling out of bounds certain analytical schemas and 
ideological agendas. This hegemony, however, has not gone unchallenged. 
 
III. Disciplinary ‘Crisis’ and the Incommensurability of Research Paradigms 
In the midst of the Cold War historiographical debate between orthodox, realist and 
revisionist historians, a perceptive commentator saw the struggle in terms of “who had the 
right to control the assumptions of history”.55 Following the rise to prominence of New Left 
historiography in the 1960s, realists could no longer claim complete control of the study U.S 
diplomatic history.56 Subsequent decades have seen the field undergo a dramatic 
transformation, whereupon diplomatic history can be said to involve “virtually any kind of 
relationship between political units, peoples and societies, not just between modern 
nations”.57 But the profusion of research agendas and lines of inquiry was not solely due to 
the impact of New Left revisionism. What directed this new intellectual trajectory, above all, 
 - 17 -
was a widely perceived ‘crisis’ in the field.58 If anything, however, ‘the long crisis in U.S 
diplomatic history’ can be understood as two mutually reinforcing crises: an external crisis of 
legitimacy on the one hand and an internal crisis of identity on the other.  
The rise of new intellectual trends in the 1960s profoundly challenged traditional 
modes of inquiry in the humanities and social sciences. In the case of history, the introduction 
of the ‘new’ social history undermined the authority of older and long established fields like 
political and diplomatic history. Retaining an elite focus and relying on positivist 
methodologies, they seemed out of step with the historiographical mood, regularly inviting 
charges of archaism, elitism, parochialism and ethnocentrism. There was a collective unease 
amongst diplomatic historians about the declining fortunes of their discipline, the extent of 
which could be measured by the number of ‘state of the field’ articles addressing the issue 
published in books, journals and periodicals in the 1970s and 1980s.59  
Responding to their seeming irrelevance, leading diplomatic historians sought 
reinvigoration through an intellectual engagement with numerous other scholarly disciplines. 
Yet this has served to reinforce questions about what diplomatic history is and ought to be; 
interventions that simultaneously attempt to define, redefine or reshape the parameters of 
discourse. The process of widening the field’s conceptual horizons constitutes a fundamental 
reconfiguration of the institutional and discursive structures of diplomatic history, the 
boundaries of legitimate discourse and the distribution of forces across the discipline. As a 
result, the goal of greater academic relevance and legitimacy has raised ideological tensions 
that have impeded progress towards the vision of a unified field of study.  
As new categories of analysis, objects of inquiry and interpretive frameworks have 
multiplied, the field has fragmented into separate research domains each with their own vision 
of what diplomatic history is; a tendency that seems to perpetuate rather than end diplomatic 
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history’s isolation. Frank Ninkovich declares that “diplomatic historians sort themselves out 
on the basis of their affiliation with different interpretive traditions that dictate 
incommensurable research strategies”.60 These schisms are rooted in the ideological split 
between the New Left revisionists and the traditional realists, yet they have been conditioned 
by the discipline’s own internal politics, as research priorities and agendas have diverged and 
diversified.   
In this context, realism has been the biggest loser in the sense that by having to 
accommodate alternative paradigms, it has been forced to cede ground to other approaches. 
The increased conceptual and interpretive pluralism, the focus on non-state actors and rise of 
new objects of inquiry has eroded the imperative to define the state as the central locus of 
explanation. On the whole, realist historians have remained the most resistant to new 
approaches and the most unreflexive towards their own theoretical suppositions. Yet even 
they have updated their approach, adding new layers of explanation by setting policymaking 
within broader contexts and deploying analytical frameworks borrowed from Political Science 
and International Relations, such as bureaucratic politics, strategy and geopolitics. However, 
such complexity has tended to reinforce realism’s overall ideological predisposition. 
Contrastingly, revisionist diplomatic historians, by wrestling control away from 
realism to define the boundaries of the field, led the way in opening up research in the 
domains of economics, ideology, power, and social structure. But as their work passed into 
the mainstream, commitments to certain modes of interpretation, such as the Open Door 
thesis, were revised or even abandoned. The process of legitimising revisionism modified or 
mediated lines of inquiry, where criticism of early revisionist historiography can be said to 
have reconfigured old approaches and spawned new interpretive frameworks. Both 
‘corporatism’ and ‘world-systems theory’, for example, can be seen as a response to the 
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demands imposed on properly disciplined historical knowledge. Such an imperative it is 
suggested has worked to diffuse the ideological thrust of left revisionism. 
Increasingly, diplomatic historians of various persuasions have taken to describing the 
topography of the field in the hope more than expectation of finding some shared terrain on 
which to ground a common dialogue over the nature and practice of diplomatic history. These 
proposals offer “synthesis” or promises “to bridge the ideological divide” or a “taxonomy for 
American diplomatic history”, as measures to transcend the continued impasse.61 Still, the 
sense of incommensurability remains and has become all the more acute given the recent 
‘cultural turn’ in diplomatic history. This intra-disciplinary conflict over the meaning of 
diplomatic history is animated by the twin impulse to maintain its distinctive identity as form 
of knowledge whilst shaping that identity in such a way as to serve a particular ideological 
perspective.   
 
PART B 
IV. Ideology, Identity and the Cold War  
Having no common ties of ethnicity, heritage, religion, or culture to bind the nation, U.S. 
leaders have relied upon the traditions of providential destiny, chosenness, and national 
mission, to construct visions of America as “a project for mankind”.62 This has led to a 
tendency to see America as both separate from and different to the rest of the world. David 
Ryan states that “[i]n the absence of a shared past, the search for identity produced narratives 
of difference and exception. National identities focused on what the Americans were not, their 
practices and values were set apart from and above those of the Europeans of the ‘old’ 
world”.63 
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The theme of exceptionalism indicated here is important for understanding how 
constructions of U.S. identity have conditioned the formulation of U.S. foreign policy. It has 
infused the framework through which foreign policy has been articulated with a moral force, 
offering justifications of American power not on the grounds of raison d’état, but through 
messianic crusades to universalise the values of freedom, democracy and self-determination. 
As a result, Americans often thought of themselves as altruistic, virtuous, and anti-imperial in 
their dealings with the outside world. In contrast, they viewed the outside with suspicion, if 
not hostility, reducing the complexities of international politics to a separation of the world 
between the ‘good’ America and the ‘evil other’. This outlook has been reinforced by a 
history and experience of U.S. diplomacy that for long periods was remote and aloof from 
world affairs, encouraging a diplomatic style and modus operandi that contrasted with 
European power politics.64  
During the Cold War, U.S. policymakers borrowed from this array of discursive 
strategies and modes of representation in order to reconstruct the meaning and identity of 
United States in relation to emerging confrontation with the Soviet Union. The repetition of 
these ideological themes by U.S. officials, public figures and intellectuals, suffused American 
political life, creating a ‘culture of the Cold War’.65 In turn, a broad-based consensus on the 
definition of American power and interests in the world was forged, which provided 
widespread public support for U.S. Cold War policies throughout the 1950s and early 1960s.   
 
V. Cold War Constructs: ‘Good versus Evil’ and ‘National Security’ 
In the hands of ‘post-structuralist’ theorists, the concept of identity has become mutable, 
contingent and subject to the disruptive force of discursive practices that do not only shape, 
but constitute its meaning. Relieved of its metaphysical essence, identity is intrinsically 
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unstable and incomplete. According to William Connolly, “identity requires difference in 
order to be, and it converts difference into otherness in order to secure its own self-identity”.66 
Thus, ontologically speaking, identity exists only insofar as there is a relation between the 
‘self’ and an ‘other’; to wit, in relation to something that threatens to subvert identity, the 
exclusion of which renders identity more permanent. However, the boundaries of 
‘identity/difference’ are not contiguous with the fixed borders of the state. Instead, they can 
be said to be common to both internal and external spheres, demarcating lines of division 
between practices, values and moral codes that correspond to ‘America’ and those which are 
excluded as ‘other’. 
From this perspective, scholars have argued that the confrontation with the Soviet 
Union can be seen as a means of reconstituting the basis of American identity and obscuring 
it’s fundamentally discursive character, than as a defence against an external threat.67 David 
Campbell declares, “the Cold War is an important moment in the reproduction of American 
identity that was not dependent upon (though clearly influence by) the Soviet Union for its 
character”.68 Of course, diplomatic historians have gone to great lengths to prove whether the 
United States or the Soviet Union was responsible for causing the Cold War, but that exercise 
misses the crucial point raised here. So in asking ‘why Cold War?’ one must wrestle not only 
with complex historical questions, such as Soviet intentions or the breakdown of the 
geopolitical order, but the very concept of the Cold War and its meaning. “What must be 
explained”, writes Stephanson, “is why it took the extremely nasty form it did, why it became 
a Cold War”.69 
This brings us back to the question of American ideology. Odd Arne Westad declares, 
“it was to a great extent American ideas and their influence that made the Soviet-American 
conflict into a Cold War” [emphasis in original].70 The evidence to substantiate this claim 
 - 22 -
includes the widely shared view of a cautious and pragmatic Stalin, who had hoped to avoid 
precisely the kind of conflict that ensued. However, this is not to say that Stalin did not 
‘cause’ the Cold War, only that it was not his intention, nor in his interest.71 In addition, it has 
been contended that whilst both U.S. and Soviet foreign policies were driven by ideological 
imperatives, it was the former that actively sought global hegemony through the projection of 
its ideas.72 The underlying premise is that the Cold War derived its meaning from uniquely 
American characteristics; “the Cold War turned out to be the American way of conflict”, in 
Stephanson words.73 
 
 
‘Good versus Evil’ 
When President Truman announced in his message to Congress that the world was divided 
into mutually antagonistic “ways of life”, he was rearticulating the meaning of U.S national 
identity in the opposition of ‘freedom’ and ‘totalitarianism’. This kind of distinction had 
numerous historical antecedents, most notably in the war against Hitler’s Germany. Indeed it 
has been suggested that the conceptual formation established by Roosevelt to represent the 
struggle against Fascist tyranny, codified into such statements as “Unconditional Surrender” 
and the “Four Freedoms”, was ‘redeployed’ in the construction of the Cold War.74 It enabled 
the lessons of World War Two to be filtered through ideological lenses, as signified by 
‘Munich’ and ‘appeasement’, which conflated them with the initial experience of dealing with 
the Soviets, turning an erstwhile enemy into a hostile foe and unremitting source of enmity.75 
However, this “was not mere repetition”, according to Stephanson: “It was a new constitution 
of the Other and a new affirmation of the Self as the negation of that which was thus being 
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excluded”.76 Thus, invoking the Soviet ‘threat’, as personified by the Truman Doctrine, 
became a mechanism for the naturalising and partial fixing of American identity. 
The construction of the Cold War was framed in a language composed of a series of 
binary oppositions – freedom-slavery, democracy-dictatorship and good-evil, which reduced a 
complex and heterogeneous world to Manichean dimensions. This kind of ideological 
reductionism was indispensible for policymakers seeking to communicate a coherent 
understanding of reality and offering prescriptions for how to deal with that reality, but it also 
had the deleterious effect of constraining the foreign policy debate and marginalising dissent. 
 
National Security 
The United States reorientation to the world in the postwar period was facilitated by the newly 
fashioned construct of ‘national security’, which “provided the common discursive terrain 
upon which internationalists of both the national interest, realist school and the collective 
security school could unite”.77 Without a clear strategic vision, yet faced by a dire situation in 
Europe and uncertainty over Soviet intentions, the doctrine of national security shaped 
American perceptions of the postwar world and the international role the United States would 
play. Indeed, the term legitimised the rise of American globalism whilst extinguishing any 
remaining remnants of isolationalism. Frank Ninkovich defines the conceptual transition 
signalled by national security in the context of Henry Luce’s declaration of the ‘American 
Century’, stating “by emphasising the survival of the American way of life over survival as 
such, Luce was defining, or redefining, the national interest in terms of identity”.78  
 
Put together, the construction of the bipolar Cold War framework and the discourse of 
national security were two sides of the same foreign policy coin: by defining U.S. security in 
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terms of the defence of the American ‘way of life’ globally, it became necessary to invoke the 
communist menace as the cause of instability in the world in order to justify US actions 
abroad, construed as an act of self-defence against ‘illegitimate’ aggression. These constructs 
fused with other powerful impulses like mission, virtue and anti-communism belonging to an 
ideology of ‘American nationalist globalism’, which reinforced arguments against 
cooperation and compromise with the Kremlin.79 In this context, the doctrine of ‘containment’ 
took on an ideological complexion as the crusade against a monolithic communist enemy was 
launched. The idea of simply containing the Soviet Union, originally prescribed by George 
Kennan in his ‘Long Telegram’ and ‘X’-article, would no longer suffice. “The 
universalisation of the policy”, writes David Ryan, “the implications [sic] required a 
conceptual universalisation of the Soviet threat”.80 The effect was to create an irreducible 
tension between the necessities of explaining US intervention and the means and ends of 
containment strategy. At the time, such difficulties were scarcely acknowledged as debate was 
sidelined, dissent closed off and issues restricted to questions of implementation. Only later, 
when the United States faced a disastrous foreign policy predicament did these latent tensions 
resurface.  
In the late 1940s, the consolidation of the Cold War consensus was far advanced. The 
grand narrative of an American-led ‘free world’ against the ‘totalitarian’ menace of the Soviet 
Union and its communist proxies offered a simplified, yet powerful explanation of why the 
Cold War had arisen. The constant repetition of this image in representations of social 
‘reality’ maintained the consensus on the necessity of meeting the communist threat and 
infused constructions of American identity. Historiographically speaking, this ideological 
framework and the tensions embedded within it provided the conditions of possibility for 
historical writing on the Cold War as well as the interpretive shifts that arose.  
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Chapter 2 
Orthodoxy and Consensus 
I. American Intellectuals and the Cold War Consensus 
The construction of a Cold War consensus in the late 1940s and 1950s was not solely the 
outcome of effort by American political leaders and government officials. Prominent 
American intellectuals, both liberal and conservative, also contributed to in no small measure 
to propagating ideas and values that enveloped American political and intellectual culture. 
They held in common not only a perspective that was entrenched in the bipolar division of 
Cold War, but which also reflected a general pessimistic tenor about the world and man’s 
place in it. According to Michael Hogan, this outlook comprised “a feeling that progress was 
not inevitable, a loss of faith in man’s basic goodness, a belief in the pervasiveness of evil, a 
suspicion of mass political movements, a faith in elite rule and a conviction that totalitarian 
regimes were globally ambitious and had to be contained”.81  
If there was a defining intellectual motif of the 1950s, then it was the concentrated 
fusion of power and knowledge in the service of the American state, which permitted certain 
practices as it closed others off. This sometimes took quiet overt forms, where various arms of 
the government, officially and unofficially, provided direction, organisation and, above all, 
funding for projects inside and outside academia.82 In the view of some, this alliance of 
scholarship and state power was indicative of the anti-communist repression of academic 
freedoms and the closing down of dissent,83 though it also took less direct, more diffuse and 
complex forms that cannot so easily be pigeon-holed. 
In the discourse of the social sciences, research was geared towards engineering 
technocratic solutions to the problems of social planning, economic and industrial 
development and warfare, amongst others. As a result, there was a preoccupation with kinds 
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of methodologies that could yield findings directly applicable to these problems. Behaviourist 
models of inquiry were adopted in numerous disciplines in order to aid quantification, 
prediction and facilitate the testing of hypotheses, producing ‘hard’ empirical knowledge that 
was prized by the government.84 Such an analytical framework rested on preconceptions 
about the nature of human behaviour and society, supporting values of consensus, order, and 
stability, which were assumed to be the ultimate goal of inquiry. More complex, obscure and 
difficult to quantify categories of intellectual phenomena were overlooked. Behaviourists 
“discounted the power of ideas and values as motivating forces in the human experience”, 
writes Ron Robin, “preferring, instead, to treat ideology and belief systems as mere 
rationalizations of behaviorial modes”.85 These methodological choices, although not 
reducible to the impact of the Cold War, functioned in a manner that supported underlying 
assumptions about the American purpose and helped to perpetuate totalitarian images of the 
Soviet Union.86 
Elsewhere, the ties between government agencies and intellectual culture are more 
ambiguous than manipulation and domination of the former over the latter. The rise of Cold 
War cultural fronts is a case in point.87 The formation of the CIA-funded Congress for 
Cultural Freedom (CCF), for example, was not just a ruse to manufacture an official Cold 
War culture in order to support U.S. foreign policy.88 Although it was part of the effort “to 
contain Soviet influence in cultural circles and mobilize Western intellectuals behind the 
American side in the Cold War”, the way to achieve that goal aroused differences of 
opinion.89 If anything, what divided participants was the question of how to negotiate or 
reconcile the demand to wage the Cold War struggle with the defence of freedom and civil 
liberties at home. Hardliners like James Burnham urged a more forceful prosecution of the 
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anti-communist crusade, whereas others like Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. saw its excesses as 
damaging to cultural freedom.90 
Disagreements such as these reflect the latent tensions within the Cold War consensus 
as a whole. Initiatives to promote “convergence of moderate leftist and rightist positions 
towards a broadly social democratic centre” can be seen as a response to broader ideological 
shifts that had undermined the American liberal democratic tradition.91 The Great Depression, 
the New Deal, the rise of totalitarianism and World War Two, represented challenges to the 
values of democracy, liberty, and capitalism. Furthermore, amidst global Cold War, tensions 
were magnified once it became clear that something more substantive than anti-communism 
and diatribes against the evils of Soviet totalitarianism was required. The communist 
alternative to the conception of economic and political progress, tied to free-markets and 
liberal democracy, vied for influence in areas of the ‘Third World’, where decolonisation 
fuelled by nationalism threatened the established order. 
Conceptually, the construction of ‘freedom’ as defined in opposition to 
‘totalitarianism’ was reconfigured in the ‘end-of-ideology’ discourse, which was rationalised 
on the premise that the rise of totalitarian ideologies – fascism and communism – constituted 
the failure of political utopianism and had thereby collapsed the distinctions of right and left.92 
In the title of Arthur Schlesinger’s The Vital Center, the liberal anti-communist consensus 
became “the politics of freedom”.93 Defined as non-ideological, the meaning and identity of 
freedom in the American image, that is, democratic institutions combined with a private 
enterprise economy, was universalised. “US ideological constructs were not seen as such”, 
writes David Ryan, and “‘the American way of life’ and its democracy were seen as 
essentially anti-ideological”.94 Thus, criticism of American activities on the grounds of goals 
or ends was deemed illegitimate and ruled out of bounds.  
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The urge to eradicate ideology from politics was also a central concern for sociologists 
like Daniel Bell, who argued “ideology, which was once a road to action, has come to a dead 
end”. Instead, contending political interests would be mitigated through social engineering, 
industrial management and a ‘mixed economy’ with shared state-private controls. Stephen 
Whitfield argues “intellectuals endorsed the resort to pragmatic resolution of conflict as 
essential to the health of a democracy”.95 This technocratic approach was wedded to liberal 
democratic values and infused American ideas on development and modernisation as tools to 
raise living standards and to stymie communist or ‘independent’ progress in the Third 
World.96 Yet it was also here where the American construction of freedom was contested by 
intractable ‘realities’ that could not be easily packaged into Washington’s binary framework. 
  In many respects, the historiographical counterpart to the ‘end of ideology’ was a rise 
of ‘consensus’ history, as exemplified in the writings of Richard Hofstadter, Daniel Boorstin, 
and Louis Hartz. This new historiographical current represented a repudiation of progressive 
era historiography, with its focus on the struggle between the ‘interests’ and the ‘people’, 
replacing it with an account of the American past that was celebratory and triumphal, 
stressing the continuity and harmony of the U.S. liberal tradition. They also reaffirmed the 
notion that America was resolutely non-ideological. “It was the very rejection of theories and 
ideologies”, writes Howard Schonenberger, “that was the peculiar and beneficent genius of 
the American experience”.97 Like in other academic realms, homogeneity and convergence 
was the order of the day, running alongside the active repression and marginalisation of 
radical dissent within the discipline.98 
In the discourse on American foreign policy, the parameters of critique are detectable 
in the writings of so-called realist commentators, who provided some of the most pertinent 
criticism of the 1940s and 1950s. Realist writers, notably George Kennan, Hans Morgenthau, 
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and Walter Lippmann, meshed historical and contemporary perspectives on the Cold War in 
order to try and actively shape foreign policy. As a concept, realism’s definition is notoriously 
slippery, as it has been used in variety of contexts to explain quiet often diverse ideas. In the 
context of U.S. foreign relations, Lloyd Gardner writes “the simplest way to define ‘realism’ 
might be to say that it was a reaction against the Wilsonian-Rooseveltian ‘idealism’, 
particularly as expressed in ‘one-world-ism’”.99  
The realist approach can be described as a normative orientation on international 
politics that stresses the immutable and indivisible nature of power in its ability to determine 
relations between states. Rooted in the European tradition of realpolitik, realists argued that in 
the absence of a common sovereign the international system was anarchic in nature, which 
meant the ostensible aim of the state was to guarantee its own survival by encouraging 
stability in the system. Accordingly, the basis for a solvent foreign policy was a rational 
calculation of the national interest which would encourage a balance of power between 
nation-states and thus mitigate rivalry. Of course, if that was not achievable then recourse to 
limited war, to readdress the balance of power, was the only alternative.100 
As articulated by Kennan, Morgenthau and Lippmann, realism became a vehicle 
through which to articulate recommendations for policymakers that emphasised the 
inescapable limits of power and the need to carry out foreign policy in line with the ‘national 
interest’. Though by no means unanimous, realists grew concerned by the global 
commitments of the United States, which threatened to overstretch American power and 
resources. Lippmann, who penned the first substantive critique of the evolving policy of 
containment, denounced it as being a “strategic monstrosity” and “fundamentally unsound”, a 
plan that “cannot made to work, and that any attempt to make it work will cause us to 
squander our substance and our prestige”.101 What he saw in containment was a strategic 
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deficiency, principally a failure to discriminate between vital and peripheral interests and an 
inability to specify a link between means available and ends sought. Indeed, he questioned 
whether there was such an aim, stating that containment ‘did not have as its objective a 
settlement of the conflict with Russia”.102  
It is ironic that Lippmann’s attack was chiefly directed at Kennan’s ‘X’ article, since 
Kennan himself would later echo similar sentiments about the need to open negotiations with 
the Russians. They argued that, without the prospect of a negotiated settlement, the Cold War 
would continue indefinitely, becoming increasingly burdensome in terms of American 
manpower and resources. Notwithstanding the contradictions in Kennan’s own thought, 
which helped to supply the rationale for policies he would later come to oppose, both he and 
Lippmann saw the Soviet challenge with a relative degree of equanimity.  
Despite their pointed criticisms, however, they were unable to shape the foreign policy 
debate. This was due partly to a reticence on the part of Americans to define their policy 
actions in terms anything other than those that professed dedication to a higher mission. 
Kennan excoriated what he called “the legalist-moralist approach to international problems”, 
which was “the most serious fault of our past policy formulation”.103 Neither he nor 
Lippmann, however, disputed the underlying assumptions on which sweeping ideological 
rhetoric and moral exhortations were founded. They never doubted that the Soviet Union 
would expand its influence unless checked by American power, nor questioned the need to act 
purposefully in the pursuit of the national interest. Indeed, they defined American security 
interests in terms of the defence against the Soviet Union, leaving implicit their dedication to 
an international order established on U.S. principles of liberal democratic capitalism. “What 
was disturbing about the new realists of the forties and fifties”, Christopher Lasch explains, 
“was their willingness to prematurely commit themselves to a view of American society in 
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which the United States appeared unambiguously as the leader of the ‘free-world’ and the 
only alternative, for all its faults, to Soviet ‘despotism’”.104 
Furthermore, despite considerable efforts, realists like Kennan and Morgenthau were 
not able to delineate an objective and universally accepted standard on which to harness the 
much vaunted “national interest”. Instead, they were reduced to invoking some ill-defined 
notion of “national character” or “culture”.105 In the end, Cold War realists were neither able 
to advance an alternative vision, nor offer a substantive critique of foreign policy because of 
their adherence to the ideological consensus and basic American goals.   
An elaboration of the discourse of intellectuals helps to illuminate the ideological 
formation of the Cold War and the discursive practices that constituted it. It is argued that 
intellectuals of the 1950s reflected, maintained and redirected the process if legitimising 
representations of U.S. identity and other Cold War constructs. This was not, however, always 
an active and consistent pursuit on their part. Rather it is suggested that identifiable limits of 
discourse conditioned practices, but did not ultimately determine the course of intellectual 
trends. Convergence was established, however, on the self-evident purpose of the United 
States in the world, that the United States resolutely did not have an ‘ideology’ and that the 
Soviet Union was the chief external threat to the security of the nation. Of course, tensions 
arose and disagreements emerged inside the Cold War consensus, over the construction of 
‘freedom’, and the means and ends of ‘containment’, which themselves reflected the 
conceptual tensions between U.S. ideological abstractions and the complexities of 
international politics, where the need to undermine the communist threat incongruous to the 
requirements of defining and redefining the meaning of ‘America’ and articulations of 
freedom.  
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II. Orthodoxy, Realism and the Interpretation of Cold War Origins 
The early historical writing on the origins of the Cold War shared family resemblances with 
both consensus historiography and realism, but the interpretive framework employed in the 
literature was conditioned, most of all, by the representation of the U.S.-Soviet confrontation 
as articulated by American policymakers. What became known as the ‘orthodox thesis’, 
exemplified in the works of Herbert Feis and William H. McNeill, was an elaboration of the 
views first put down by Washington officials. According to Staughton Lynd “they [Feis and 
McNeil] represent the collective memory of British and American officialdom about their 
wartime alliance with Soviet Russia and how it broke down”.106 The coincidence of outlook 
was no accident. What Michael Hunt calls the “much-traveled bridge between the world of 
scholarship and government” in diplomatic history was never more apparent than in the early 
postwar period, especially in light of the wartime service rendered by members of the 
profession.107 This was not simply a personal bias, however; it was an institutional 
presupposition.108 Orthodox historians, to be sure, shared the official Cold War perspective 
and through their narratives advanced it. This can be seen in an examination of the major 
points of interpretive convergence which characterised both orthodox and realist accounts. 
First, orthodox scholars supported the view that the United States had no other 
interests than to encourage international cooperation and harmony. In the immediate postwar 
period, McNeill writes “the United States…stood relatively in the background, seeking to re-
establish as soon as possible a ‘normality’”.109 Feis records that “Truman and his advisers 
sought settlements which corresponded to principles and aims that soared beyond the ordinary 
satisfactions and rewards of victory”.110 There was little said here about the character of U.S. 
interests or the kind of ‘peace’ or ‘normality’ American officials envisaged and its 
implications for U.S.-Soviet relations. 
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Second, they reaffirmed the aggressive and expansionist features of Soviet behaviour 
in Eastern Europe. On this point, most shared the official wisdom that Moscow was intent on 
global domination and was therefore responsible for the breakdown of wartime cooperation. 
Those who shared this view tended to see the conflict as essentially foreordained. “No 
American policy given Moscow’s theology”, writes Arthur Schlesinger Jnr, “could hope to 
win basic Soviet confidence, and every American action was poisoned from the source. So 
long as the Soviet Union remained a messianic state, ideology compelled steady 
expansion”.111 
Others, however, were more inclined to view the U.S.-Soviet antagonism as a power 
struggle rather than a clash of competing moral values. Louis Halle wrote that the Cold War 
was “not a case of the wicked against the virtuous”, but an “irreducible dilemma” rather like 
putting a “scorpion and a tarantula together in a bottle”.112 Halle’s emphasis on power politics 
betokens a realist inclination, downplaying the importance of communist ideology as a factor 
in understanding Soviet motives. This argument reconfigures the ‘inevitability thesis’ by 
suggesting that the causes of the conflict were to be found primarily in the breakdown of the 
geopolitical order. McNeil expresses this sentiment, writing “it was not Truman nor Churchill 
nor Stalin who broke up the Alliance but the disappearance of a common enemy”.113 Still, the 
general disposition of realist historians was to see Russia as aggressive and the United States 
as defensive.  
Cold War historians and writers of the ‘fifties’ often find themselves positioned along 
a continuum between the poles of orthodoxy (or ‘traditionalism’) and realism. The disparity 
resides chiefly in how to define U.S. interests given the nature of the Soviet challenge and, 
therefore, a definition of the proper response.114 What is at issue here is not strictly historical. 
As Thomas McCormick notes, traditionalists and realists “differ in normative judgements 
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rather than in interpretation”.115 Those of a more ‘idealist’ persuasion supported the global 
confrontation. “Diplomatic historians”, according to Peter Novick, “contributed most 
wholeheartedly and directly to the support and the defence of the American cause in the Cold 
War… [by] linking America’s struggles with the Axis and with the Soviet Union as 
successive stages in one continuous and unavoidable struggle of the Free World against 
expansionist totalitarians”.116 Even realists remained attached to the notion that American 
interests lay in a certain kind of international order which managed change in certain kind of 
way and saw the Soviet Union as the main source of instability in the world and the greatest 
potential threat to that order. When viewed from the vantage point of the interpretive 
framework, we can see how orthodox historiography reinforces the overall ideological 
consensus on the Cold War and fundamental purpose of the United States. The representation 
of the actions, behaviour and motives of the United States and the Soviet Union is inscribed 
by the binary divisions symptomatic of the Cold War formation. Steven Hurst describes how 
“traditionalist accounts depict a Manichean world of good versus evil in which American 
policy is always honest, generous and for the good of all and Russian policy always devious, 
self-serving and a mortal threat”.117 This attribute also infuses other interpretive choices, such 
as the narrow focus on elites, the lack of constraint placed on agency and a positivist 
methodology, which privileges the statements of U.S policymakers, allowing them to 
powerfully shape the form and content of the narrative. Orthodox historians, for example, 
shared the perception of U.S. officials that they were always responding to Soviet expansion. 
This unspoken assumption enables them to evade discussion of any internal motivating 
factors and confers legitimacy and justification on the commitment to halting Soviet advances 
and re-building Western strength. This is the juncture where realists often depart, seeing 
global containment as imprudent and unnecessary.  
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Chapter 3 
Fault Lines and Fractures in the Cold War Formation 
The ability of an ideological formation to sustain its legitimacy and its hegemonic position 
within a given social milieu depends on the extent to which it can exhaust the range of all 
possible interpretations of ‘events’ in ‘reality’ and, thus, eliminate the grounds for counter-
hegemonic interpretations. As Terry Eagleton suggests “this process…involves the ideology 
in creating as tight a fit as possible between itself and social reality, thereby closing the gap 
into which the leverage of critique could [sic] be inserted”.118 Given the mutability of 
contingency of social existence, however, ideologies do not produce entirely unified or 
coherent representations of the way the world exists. David Campbell describes an 
“irreducible, irresolvable, ‘floating indetermination’ in both the conditions of our existence 
and the established ways of representing them”.119 Therefore, there is always a potential for 
the subversion of an ideological framework and the conceptual constructs it deploys which 
pre-exists the practices and discourses that constitute them.    
In respect to the Cold War, the binary logic rooted in the articulations of ‘freedom’ 
and ‘totalitarianism’ inscribed into the discourse of U.S. foreign policy was especially potent, 
since it successfully diminished the realm of complexity, enabling its reproduction in other 
cultural spheres. This was also a major source of weakness, however, since the stability 
engendered was predicated on the clear, definite separation of the conceptual boundaries 
between the ‘self’ and the ‘other’. Rationalising power over the interpretation of events rested 
on the continued repetition of such sharp delineations in order to maintain the credibility of 
the meanings they created. The framework retained its authority so long as shifts in the 
representation of reality could be successfully mediated. A challenge presents itself, however, 
when ambiguities and contradictions can be observed revealing the limits of ideological 
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explanation. Campbell indicates that “any transformation in the objects of enmity might… 
belie the persistence of the logic they serve”.120  
Consequently, it can be said that the tensions inscribed in the construction of the Cold 
War and U.S identity were exacerbated by changes in the U.S.-Soviet confrontation, which, as 
a result, blurred the lines of division between those reified categories and distinctions, 
creating the possibility for practices and discourses that served alternative political interests 
and socio-cultural identities.121 Although the 1950s represented a period of pervasive 
ideological homogeneity, when debates on foreign policy concentrated on the best way to 
prosecute the global struggle and political discourse restricted pluralism and marginalised 
effective criticism of domestic institutions and structures, the Cold War lost some of its 
sharpness. The representation of the moral separation of the United States and the Soviet 
Union was not seriously undermined until the Vietnam War, where America’s moral 
superiority and virtue was contested by even liberal mainstream critics.122 Yet well before 
America’s disastrous intervention in Vietnam, the frame of perception that conditioned the 
interpretation of events was shifting, creating fissures and spaces into which the potentiality 
for counter-hegemonic readings of the Cold War could be inserted into mainstream discourse.
  
I. Shifting Perceptions of the ‘Other’: The Soviet Union 
In the early postwar period, the perception of the Soviet Union as a threat was formed by U.S. 
officials as wartime cooperation evaporated over the questions of Germany and democracy in 
Eastern Europe. A leading contributor towards this process was George Kennan who in his 
‘Long Telegram’ and ‘X’ article provided a convincing explanation of Soviet behaviour and 
how it should be handled. They both helped to crystallise the attitudes of Washington officials 
towards Moscow. Kennan provided, as Gaddis states, “American officials with the intellectual 
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framework they would employ in thinking about communism and Soviet foreign policy for 
the next two decades”.123 
Although Kennan’s writings were frequently inconsistent and contradictory, they 
became influential especially because he was able “to fuse concerns about totalitarianism and 
communism in dealings with the Soviet Union”.124 The image of totalitarianism gained 
distinctive meaning in the 1930s and 1940s with the fusion of representations of Hitler’s 
Germany and depictions of Stalin’s Russia.125 Its re-emergence in the postwar period helped 
to strengthen a deep-seated strain of American thinking that internally repressive regimes are 
externally aggressive and expansionist.126  
In his famous ‘doctrine’ speech, President Truman identified the threat posed by 
“totalitarian regimes imposed on free peoples” who “undermine the foundations of 
international peace and hence the security of the United States”. As a result, the term passed 
into the common language of the Cold War. The historians Les Adler and Thomas Paterson 
write that “this popular analogy was a potent and pervasive notion that significantly shaped 
American perception of world events in the cold war”. It did so at the price of hampering 
efforts to avoid a full-blown confrontation and curtailed policies that envisaged the possibility 
of a non-adversarial relationship with the Kremlin. Those who accepted the analogy’s veracity 
assumed “that conflict with totalitarianism was inevitable after World War II; that there was 
no room for accommodation with the Soviet Union because the Communist nation was 
inexorably driven by its ideology and its totalitarianism”.127 
In response to this seemingly dire threat, U.S. policymakers laid out a global 
militarised policy of “containment” that was intended to halt communist advances and to 
thwart the supposed Soviet blueprint for global domination. Although Kennan would demur 
at the increasingly universalised approach to containment, he was initially convinced that the 
 - 38 -
United States could accelerate the break up of the Soviet Empire and the eventual collapse of 
the U.S.S.R. itself, leading to an end of hostilities. This assumption was based on the premise 
that the Soviet regime was inherently unstable and, as Kennan wrote in the ‘X’ article, “bears 
within it the seeds of its own decay”.128 He later told an audience that “I predict within six 
months we will be able to do business over the table with our Russian friends”.129 Kennan 
was proved wrong, however, as Moscow’s continued ability to maintain its grip over the 
peoples of Eastern Europe attested. Nonetheless, the assumption that the United States could 
contribute to “either the breakup or the gradual mellowing of Soviet power” was inscribed 
into the strategy of “liberation” and reinforced the logic behind the defence of ‘freedom’ on 
the perimeter. 
Under first the Truman and then the Eisenhower administration, U.S. policymakers 
believed they could rollback Soviet power by liberating the satellite nations from Soviet 
control and sowing discord within the international communist movement.130 Despite the use 
of political warfare, covert operations and what Secretary of State Dulles called 
‘brinkmanship’, Soviet hegemony was not substantially weakened. Indeed, any faint hopes for 
liberation were extinguished by the time of Moscow’s decision to crush the Hungarian 
rebellion in 1956; an event that dramatically exposed the futility of American attempts to 
rollback Soviet power. 
Of course, in order to sustain the military build-up as well as escalating global 
commitments, it became necessary to invoke the existence of a world communist conspiracy 
in order to justify U.S. intervention. The Korean War reinforced assumptions about the need 
to contain communism wherever it appeared, extending U.S. commitments to areas where 
policymakers had previously considered them to be beyond the orbit of American interests.131 
So the image of a monolithic communist conspiracy directed by Moscow was reified in U.S. 
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political discourse. The validity of that image, however, would be challenged by changes in 
the perception of the U.S.S.R.  
The 1950s were not short of Cold War crises: Korea, Vietnam, Formosa, Hungary, 
Suez and Berlin to name a few. Over the course of the decade, however, new circumstances 
emerged which created tensions and inconsistencies in the bipolar framework and the 
ideological constructs that served to ground it. Although U.S. officials would continue to rely 
on the spectre of the communist menace, the shifting contours of Cold War competition raised 
questions about the ultimate aims of the Kremlin. A period of relative calm, following the 
Korean armistice and the death of Stalin, ushered in an era of increasing stability in Europe. 
This was also at a time when both sides had reached nuclear stalemate on the continent, which 
considerably raised the stakes sides in any confrontation. “For the United States to take a 
stance of unrestrained hostility toward Russia”, Stephen Ambrose wrote “was intolerable”.132 
Recognition that victory had become a distant prospect and a de facto acceptance of 
the status quo, promoted tendencies towards accommodation and ‘peaceful coexistence’. As 
the imminent threat of communist military takeover receded and as it became evident that the 
Russians were not trying to expand their influence everywhere, the idea that the Moscow had 
embarked upon an ideological crusade aimed at the destruction of the West seemed rather less 
plausible. If anything, it suggested that the relative importance of power politics and strategic 
considerations in determining Soviet policy outweighed those of ideology.133  
Beginning in the 1950s, American writers took “a more limited view of the Soviet 
challenge”, according to Norman A. Graebner, and “questioned the fears and the ideological 
assumptions which guided the evolution of United States policy in the postwar years”.134 
Insofar as Soviet behaviour was a guide to intentions that critique appeared to have prima 
facie support. A “soft” realist line was espoused by public figures like Kennan and Walter 
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Lippmann, who saw a limited but powerful antagonist in Europe and deplored the globalist 
direction of American policy.135  
The doubts about the strategy of containment resurfaced. Indeed it appeared to be 
losing its rationale as not only did the much anticipated retraction of Soviet power never 
materialised, but the U.S.S.R. was getting stronger. The Russians could boast some notable 
achievements in the 1950s, testing the world’s first intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) 
and launching the world’s first man-made satellite, Sputnik. Even in the areas of economic 
growth and industrial output the Soviet Union appeared to be challenging American 
supremacy. It was to the surprise of many in the West that “the Soviet economic and political 
system had emerged as a genuine alternative to Western democracy”.136 
But if the logic behind containment appeared less irresistible, why did the build-up of 
Western strength and the expansion of American power continue? What was the purpose of 
containment? Realist commentators had identified from the beginning the lack of coordination 
between means and ends and discrimination between vital and peripheral interests inherent in 
the U.S. strategic doctrine. “Containment”, Graebner explains, “evolved into a package of 
means without any clearly defined body of ends which might be achievable through the more 
possession of military power”.137 One might have gone further than the realists to question 
whether in fact containment served another purpose. Of course, any such inquiry implied 
criticism of the role of the United States in the world, not merely the policies it was carrying 
out. Those who did were marginalised and completely ignored. 
These trends were magnified as the 1950s saw the Cold War struggle move into new 
battlegrounds in the ‘Third World’. In this context, the terms of acceptable debate over the 
nature of the Soviet challenge and how to deal with it underwent a reversal. The shifting 
perception of threat moved from the military towards the economic and political spheres, 
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where the Soviet Union was believed to hold certain advantages. Unfortunately, this could not 
be easily reconciled with the comparisons between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany, 
which had helped to establish the ideological framework and could only be sustained at the 
expense of increasing disparity. 
 
II. Intransigent Realities: ‘Freedom’ in the Third World 
As superpower confrontation was pushed onto the periphery, it was carried onto terrain where 
the contradictions and tensions in U.S. strategic and ideological constructs became more and 
more evident. The neat and simplistic dualities of the Cold War framework were ill-suited to 
enable a sophisticated understanding of the complex dynamic of revolutionary nationalism, 
unleashed by the process of decolonisation. Having declared war “to make the world safe for 
liberal democracy and liberal capitalism” against the forces of totalitarianism, the United 
States could not afford to allow a more nuanced or fuzzy picture to emerge of the world that 
would undermine existing representations.138 The reduction of national liberation struggles 
and their causes to Cold War dimensions, meant that U.S. foreign policy was set against the 
popular aspirations of indigenous people, which eroded the legitimacy of the narratives of 
self-determination and freedom as explanations of events, opening the door to counter-
narratives based on American Empire and imperialism.139 
The pattern of U.S. intervention in areas beyond the ‘core’ of Europe and Japan that 
began with the Korean War accelerated what one critic called “the terrifying momentum 
toward disaster”.140 The justification of American involvement, which led to the overthrow of 
popularly elected governments (Iran 1953, Guatemala 1954) and the backing of corrupt 
authoritarian regimes (notably Diem’s Vietnam) was based on the assumption of defending 
the security of the ‘free world’ against communist aggression. The power of the rationale was 
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waning as the hand of American interference became more conspicuous (i.e. the Bay of Pigs), 
whereas the communist movement seemed less monolithic as signs of growing Sino-Soviet 
became clear.  
David Ryan argues that “the Cold War created intellectual and institutional 
straightjackets that reduced most challenges to Cold War dimensions”.141 Disruptive and 
intransigent elements in the Third World did not fit into the binary of ‘free world and 
‘totalitarianism’, which constituted a transgression of the conceptual limits and boundaries of 
Cold War discourse. There was a greater distinction between the categories of good and evil 
as perceptions of threat shifted. “The culture of the Cold War decomposed when the moral 
distinction between East and West lost a bit of its sharpness”, Stephen Whitfield writes “when 
American self-righteousness could be more readily punctured, when the activities of the two 
superpowers assumed greater symmetry”.142 
The irresolution of these tensions and contradictions did not turn into a ‘crisis of 
representation’ until the increasing escalation of the Vietnam War exposed a cognitive as well 
as a moral dissonance in the construction of the American self-image.143 In this atmosphere, 
one could ask, with increasing legitimacy, about the nature of American aims and purpose in 
the world. Yet radical critics of American foreign policy had already begun to do so. Robert 
Tomes writes: “Only when Vietnam became a major foreign policy concern among the 
mainstream did it move to the heart of radical discussion”.144 As interpreters of 
historiographical trends have observed, however, the impact of the Vietnam War and the 
subsequent political and constitutional upheavals are crucial for an understanding of how 
radical historiography was gradually accepted within the historical discipline from the mid 
1960s onwards. According to Jonathan Wiener, the “political crisis undermined the 
profession’s commitment to the prevailing conception of history”, in response to which 
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leading historians “abandoned the assumption that the prevailing historical scholarship posed 
the significant questions and provided the adequate answers”. Consequently, “the profession 
redefined the field in a way that included radical historians’ conceptions of the significant 
problems requiring study”.145 
 Wiener is correct insofar as he sees the definition of the meaning of history as a 
product of historical conditions, but the assumption that underpins his analysis implies that 
this process went in one direction: political and cultural forces shaped historians’ views of the 
profession and redefined its boundaries in keeping with them. In contrast, it is argued that this 
process ought to be seen as more dialogical, where a genuine interaction takes place between 
internal disciplinary constraints and external political interests, in which meaning is 
negotiated. The outcome of this continual ‘renegotiation’ can help to elucidate more clearly 
the contours of historiographical change.  
The conceptual shifts within the Cold War formation opened up a political space that 
enabled a radical interpretation of American foreign policy to be formed and articulated. But 
this in itself is not enough to explain how Cold War revisionism was incorporated into the 
field of U.S. diplomatic history. We need to turn to the internal politics of the discipline, 
which mediated the assimilation of new historiographical tendencies. The next chapter looks 
at how revisionist historiography was able to transform disciplinary rules and conventions, 
redefining the field, but was itself ‘re-inflected’ in that process. 
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Chapter 4 
Cold War Revisionism and U.S. Diplomatic History 
I. Background: The Emergence of the “New Left” 
Although the 1950s was seen as an especially unpropitious period for the radical left, portends 
of a new radicalism were visible late in the decade. Two of the most influential intellectual 
antecedents for scholars of the ‘New Left’ were the sociologist C. Wright Mills and historian 
William Appleman Williams. Notwithstanding the differences of discipline and research, both 
formed a critical perspective towards power and culture that allowed them to analyse the 
internal structures of American society from the outside.  
In The Power Elite (1956), Mills had described the inner-workings of the dominant 
societal structures and institutions (the state, military and the corporations) and the 
mechanisms through which they exerted power and control over social life. Later, he wrote 
the classic The Sociological Imagination (1959) which attacked the prevailing social science 
methodologies that upheld the status quo. Unlike the scientific positivism that held sway, 
“Mills held out the promise of social science as a critical and historically oriented way of 
developing rational knowledge about societal structures, historical transformations and the 
capacities of human actors to maneuver [sic] within and against them”.146 Furthermore, Mills 
also took an especially jaundiced view of the proponents of the ‘end of ideology’, writing: 
the end-of-ideology is of course itself an ideology –a fragmentary one, to be sure, and perhaps more a 
mood. The end-of-ideology is in reality the ideology of an ending; the ending of political reflection 
itself as a public fact. It is a weary know-it-all justification – by tone of voice rather than by explicit 
argument – of the cultural and political default of the NATO intellectual.147 
 
In a similar vein, Williams unfurled his conception of an American Weltanschauung 
in The Tragedy of American Diplomacy (1959) and The Contours of American History 
(1961), distilling the essence of how U.S elites and other sections of society understood their 
relationship to the outside world. The beliefs, assumptions and ideals rooted in this worldview 
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were crucial in explaining the rise of a modern American Empire during the twentieth 
century. Williams saw an expansionist mentality at the heart of the American world-view, 
which developed into an imperialist impulse and a quest for ‘informal’ Empire in the 
twentieth century. 
Of course, Williams (and Mills for that matter) did not mark a complete break from 
the past, nor did he operate in an intellectual vacuum. His graduate days were spent in the 
relatively hospitable surroundings of the University of Wisconsin, which had not succumbed 
to the excesses of McCarthyism.148 Indeed, the history department at Madison remained 
something of an outpost of progressive historiography during the era of ‘consensus’. 
Williams’s return to Wisconsin as a member of the faculty in 1957 marked a significant 
moment in the rise of American radical historiography. Jonathan Wiener writes “his graduate 
seminar provided the intellectual arena in which New Left history in the United States first 
developed”.149 Out of Williams’s seminar emerged the radical journal Studies on the Left, 
launched in 1959, as did the ‘Wisconsin school’ of U.S. diplomatic history, which included 
future leading members of the discipline, such as Lloyd Gardner, Walter LaFeber and Thomas 
McCormick.150 
Though it is always difficult to estimate the influence of one person to the 
development of a trend or movement, Williams did more than anyone to provide a historical 
framework for the articulation of the radical critique in the 1960s and 1970s. Yet in 1959 that 
critique was very much at the margins of historiographical and societal debates on the Cold 
War. Political trends had yet to catch up with intellectual developments. The war in Vietnam, 
however, would change all this. 
 
II. Revisionism and the Origins of the Cold War 
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In The Tragedy of American Diplomacy, Williams’s elucidation of the “Open Door thesis” 
was a turning point in the historiography of American foreign relations.151 Tragedy was a 
sweeping reinterpretation of American diplomatic history in the twentieth century from the 
declaration of the Open Door Notes in 1899 and 1900 to the onset of the Cold War. In it, 
Williams challenged the conventional wisdom on America’s rise to global pre-eminence at 
every turn; denying that turn-of-the-century imperial expansion was an aberration, exploding 
the ‘myth’ of isolationism of the 1920s and 30s and reconfiguring the Second World War as 
“the war for the American frontier”. Williams saw a continuous imperial thread to American 
foreign policy that derived from the open door Weltanschauung, which cohered around the 
belief that the well-being of democracy and prosperity at home required overseas economic 
expansion and access to foreign markets.152  
In the context of the Cold War, Williams argued that American officials, in seeking to 
make this Open Door worldview the basis for postwar cooperation, challenged the Soviet 
Union’s sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. In the face of U.S. interference, the Kremlin 
moved to assert its hegemony over Eastern Europe in order to resolve the problem of security 
and the needs of postwar recovery. In summary, “it was the decision of the United States to 
employ its new and awesome power in keeping with the traditional Open Door Policy which 
crystallized the Cold War”.153 On its publication, Tragedy “made a rather modest splash”.154 
But shortly thereafter, Williams’ ideas entered mainstream historiographical discourse. 
The application of the “Open Door thesis” was advanced by other members of the 
“Wisconsin school”, who substantially revised and elaborated on the insights Williams 
provided into periods of American history as far back as the mind-nineteenth century, or as 
recent as the interwar period. A series of revisionist works appeared in the early-1960s, of 
which at least one received academic recognition (Walter LaFeber’s The New Empire, won 
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the AHA’s Beveridge Prize in 1962). Prior to 1965, however, not one of those scholars, who 
would be at the forefront of Cold War revisionism, had published a monograph on the Cold 
War’s origins.155  
Retrospectively, that year marked a decisive moment in the emerging debate on the 
Cold War and revisionism. Not only was it a time of rapid military escalation in Vietnam, but 
that year Gar Alperovitz published his Atomic Diplomacy; a book which greatly accelerated 
the onset of historiographical controversy. Christopher Lasch wrote in 1970 that Atomic 
Diplomacy “made it difficult for conscientious scholars to any longer avoid the challenge of 
revisionist interpretations”.156 This is perhaps somewhat ironic given the fact that several 
other revisionists did not share Alperovitz’s thesis that the Truman administration had 
deliberately dropped the atomic bombs on Japan in order to impress the Russians.157 
Nonetheless, a whole spate of revisionist works followed over the next decade. 
The most trenchant critiques of American policy emanating from the revisionist camp 
were authored by Gabriel Kolko, who alongside Williams played a pivotal role in 
disseminating revisionist arguments. In The Limits of Power, Kolko (with co-author Joyce 
Kolko) argued that “the United States’ ultimate objective at the end of World War II was both 
to sustain and to reform world capitalism”.158 The very notion of a Cold War was, for Kolko, 
merely to obfuscate the real aim of U.S. policy. In his view, the turmoil in Western Europe at 
the end of the war presented American officials with a unique opportunity to reshape the 
world economy in line with U.S. economic interests. As a consequence, Washington was 
encouraged to press its own hegemony in Eastern Europe on the conviction that it was a vital 
region in the rehabilitation of Western capitalism. The question of U.S. foreign policy, 
therefore, “was not the containment of communism, but rather more directly the extension and 
expansion of American capitalism according to its new economic power and needs”.159 
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As many historians acknowledge, there was never a single revisionist thesis. 
Substantial disagreements existed on several points of interpretation, in particular the extent 
of continuity between Roosevelt and Truman, the decision to drop the atomic bombs on 
Japan, and the importance of early sphere of influence initiatives in subsequent disagreements 
between the United States and the U.S.S.R. over Eastern Europe.160 “The revisionist critique”, 
Stephanson contends “did not suggest a single argument, except insofar as it saw the general 
causes of the cold war in American actions”.161 
Equally, there was considerable diversity between revisionists on how to structure 
interpretation, involving choices about concepts, forms of explanation and categories of 
analysis. Although many followed Williams’s intellectual trajectory, the scope of his 
interpretive horizons was so broad that it offered little concrete guidance. For the likes of 
LaFeber, Gardner and others, ideological themes outweighed economic forces. In contrast, 
Kolko pursued a more deterministic approach, where the primacy of economic interests and 
the needs of the global capitalist system were emphasised. For others, such as Alperovitz, the 
role of individual agents was fundamental. 
When revisionist historiography first appeared it received academic disapprobation 
from wide sections of the community of U.S. diplomatic historians. The exchanges over the 
origins of the Cold War were especially fierce and vituperative. Robert James Maddox’s The 
New Left and the Origins of the Cold War (1973) was notable in this regard for its attempt to 
impugn the scholarly credentials of the revisionists by insinuating that they had wilfully 
manipulated the historical record. Others who did not go that far took aim at the approach the 
revisionists adopted towards explanation as well as their general attitude towards the purpose 
of historical inquiry. 
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In the decade thereafter, the controversy over the origins of the Cold War raged, 
causing one onlooker to describe it as “historiographical warfare”.162 Later, more moderate 
voices could be heard, though a convergence of viewpoints between the warring parties never 
truly materialised. A post-revisionist ‘synthesis’ was proclaimed by the mainstream, though it 
never satisfied revisionist critics.163 Moreover, as scholarly passions cooled, attention 
refocused on the state of the discipline itself and the apparent ‘crisis’ it faced. Indeed, the 
languishing of the field was blamed on an over-reliance on dominant analytical models 
unduly shaped by the U.S.-Soviet confrontation.164  
 
III. The Ideological Challenge: Radicalism as Form 
In The Radical Left and American Foreign Policy, Robert Tucker insisted that what 
distinguished Cold War revisionism from other critiques of American diplomacy was its 
“rejection of America’s role and interests in the world”.165 Contrasting with moderate realist 
critics, who shared a similar outlook on America’s international position as partisans of U.S. 
foreign policy, the revisionists were firmly rooted in a radical politics that implied a 
fundamental transformation of American society. According to Tucker, this ideological 
position was implicit in the way they went about explaining the history of American 
diplomacy: 
The essence of the radical critique is not simply that America is aggressive and imperialistic but that it 
is so out of an institutional necessity. It is the central assumption that American imperialism must 
ultimately be traced to the institutional structure of American capitalism that is the common 
denominator of radical criticism.166 
 
Although Tucker welcomes revisionism’s focus on a self-interested and expansionist 
America, he rejects the notion that expansion can be primarily explained in terms of economic 
forces. “America’s interventionist and counterrevolutionary policy”, he wrote “is the expected 
response of an imperial power with a vital interest in maintaining an order that, apart from the 
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material benefits this order confers, has become synonymous with the nation’s vision of its 
role in history”.167 The difference between Tucker and the revisionists, as between revisionists 
and later post-revisionists, rested on the definition of the kind of world that the United States 
wanted to create.  
According to the revisionists, Washington’s decision to embark upon a global policy 
of “containment” was not primarily motivated by the desire to thwart communist advances, 
but to establish American hegemony by extending values of liberal democracy and free-
market capitalism around the world. This was a consistent strategy carried out in pursuit of a 
clear and coherent vision for the postwar period. Thomas Paterson explains that “American 
diplomacy was not accidental or aimless: rather, it was self-consciously expansionist”.168 
Looking beyond the American-Soviet confrontation, revisionists saw U.S. policies in the 
‘Third World’ as evidence of imperial domination, where Cold War rhetoric on preserving 
freedom and democracy was undermined by the quest to enforce a liberal capitalist order of 
unfettered markets and open economies. 
Where the Vietnam War was concerned, the revisionists challenged the liberal defence 
of the Cold War consensus that had represented Vietnam as an aberration and a tragedy, but 
not one that required a fundamental overhaul of U.S. foreign policy. The orthodox rationale of 
containment, which explicated American expansion as a response to the external threat of 
Soviet communism, supplied the interpretive strategies to portray American involvement as 
mistaken or misguided, but not immoral. It focused wrongdoing on intellectual errors, logical 
inconsistencies and faulty perceptions; in other words, on the failings of individuals. Still, 
given the defensive and virtuous nature of U.S. aims, American intentions remained sincere 
and honourable. “The result”, Tucker contends, “is invariably a partial justification of 
American policy and a partial exoneration of our sins”.169 
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In the radical view, however, the Vietnam War was an unavoidable outcome of 
America’s pursuit of global Empire. This interpretation, according to Robert Divine, made 
“George Kennan, not Lyndon Johnson, the scapegoat by portraying Vietnam as the 
culmination of the Cold War effort to contain communism”.170 More precisely, it was the 
revisionists focus on the structural dimensions of policymaking, defined in economic and/or 
ideological terms, that made possible an articulation of Cold War strategy as a clear, 
consistent and self-aggrandising pursuit of a global vision. This ‘frame of reference’ was also 
innately pejorative since revisionists saw this vision as a conflation of capitalism and 
democracy in the U.S. conception of ‘freedom’. Paterson argued that “Americans considered 
themselves democratic because they were prosperous and prosperous because they were 
democratic”.171 Above all, the revisionist interpretation directly contested the meaning and 
identity of the United States as it had been represented in orthodox accounts. It challenged the 
moral superiority and exceptionalism in depictions of American foreign policy from an 
‘idealist’ perspective and subverted the realist preoccupation with power politics (which itself 
presumed identity, thereby suppressing it) by privileging economics over politics and 
structure over agency in explanation.  
Tucker’s description of radical revisionism was not without its own flaws.172 First, he 
failed to appreciate that the economic analysis of revisionism did not depend absolutely on the 
requirements of the American economy calculable in terms of exports, imports, and 
investments. Second, he did not give adequate weight to the distinction made between 
ideological motives and economic interests. The point to be emphasised here, however, is that 
Tucker identifies the relationship between the form of explanation as deployed in revisionist 
interpretations and their ideological disposition. Yet this cannot be explained simply be 
reducing the former to the latter. It is argued that the form (or what we might otherwise call 
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the interpretive framework) exists in reciprocal tension with ideology, on the one hand, and 
the disciplining of historical knowledge, on the other. Thus, the form is constitutive of 
ideology, shaping how ideological codes can be represented in the historical field. We can 
examine this contention in more detail if we focus on the way revisionists employed 
ideological factors in their interpretive approach.  
 
IV. The ‘Open Door’, Ideology and the Radical Form 
As we have suggested, the revisionists were not of one mind. Williams, unlike Kolko, never 
went so far as to attribute avaricious motives to American policymakers. As he put it, “the 
tragedy of American diplomacy is not that it is evil, but that it denies and subverts American 
ideas and ideals”.173 Williams retained a belief in the ultimate realisation of U.S. values of 
freedom and self-determination through a radical re-visioning of American society, which is 
reflected in how ideological connotations infuse his interpretive framework. An exploration of 
the relationship between the form and ideology in the work of Williams demonstrates the 
nature of his incorporation into diplomatic history.  
As in the case of George Kennan, the realist position on ideology has been largely a 
negative one. The role assigned ideals and morals (never an ‘ideology’ as such) is typically 
one that explains why policymakers failed to understand the ‘realities’ of international politics 
and why their judgement erred. In a philosophical sense, ideas and ideologies are exogenous 
to the workings of power politics, functioning only as error. 
In the writings of Williams, ideology played a more constitutive role in determining 
the course of American diplomacy. Through the formulation of the Open Door thesis, 
Williams’s writings represented an ambitious attempt to integrate ideas and material interests, 
thought and social reality into explanation. Frank Ninkovich recognises the Open Door thesis 
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for its “acknowledgement of the qualified autonomy of ideological causation [which] 
represents, in terms of increased theoretical scope, a major advance” over alternative 
interpretations.174 His praise is vitiated, though, by objections raised to the primacy accorded 
to economic motivations in the Open Door conception of ideology.  
For critics and interpreters of Williams’ thought, the focus on economics is narrow 
and reductionist, for although it affords ideational factors a degree of autonomy, it relegates 
non-economic phenomena to second-order variables, robbing them of causal vitality.175 What 
we are left with is a form of “economic ideology”.176 All that said, there is an irresolvable 
tension in the conception of the Weltanschauung between the capitalist system and ideology, 
as several critics have noted. Tucker explains: 
the reader is never quiet clear – because Williams is never quite clear – whether America’s institutions 
necessitated expansion or whether America has been expansionist out of a mistaken conviction that the 
continued well-being, if not the very existence, of these institutions required constant expansion.177 
 
If the former, then why did Williams spend so long trying to clarify the concept of a 
Weltanschauung? If the latter, one is left with the impression that U.S. expansion was the 
result of a faulty belief system. The insinuation being that ideology is, at bottom, “illusory”.178  
Though we can never be sure of what precisely Williams meant, in more lucid moments he 
did make more exacting statements about the nature of what he described as a “way of life”:  
 
A way of life is the combination of patterns of thought and action that, as it becomes habitual and 
institutionalized, defines the thrust and character of a culture and society… each society holds in 
common certain assumptions about reality, everyday those assumptions guide and set limits upon its 
members – their awareness and perception, their understanding of cause and consequence, their sense of 
options, and their range of actions.179 
 
Here, the definition of Williams amounts not to integration, but to the elision of the 
distinction between thought and material reality; a move that poses certain difficulties for 
conventional historical explanation. As one critic wrote, “it is difficult to conceive of any 
American policy, or any evidence about the reasons for its adoption that could not be 
incorporated into the Williams interpretation”.180 As Schlesinger stated more bluntly: 
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“Because it explains everything, it explains very little. It is not a testable historical hypothesis 
at all. It is a theological dogma”.181  
The difficulty here is that the form of explanation Williams proposes is outside the 
discipline’s bounds of ‘acceptability’. As a field of inquiry, diplomatic history is attached to 
the assumption “that there are material causes to which events and actions can be reduced”.182 
Explanations, to be considered as such, presuppose the existence of “objective, hard, 
substantial realities” that can “be accessed by social scientific methodology”.183 This creates 
difficulties for both realist and revisionist alike in terms of situating ideology within 
explanations of cause and effect.  
A conceptual tension resides in the need to submit causal explanations for events that 
are necessarily over-determined, implicitly demanding that ideas or mental phenomena are 
reduced to other material causes or conditions. Since all evidence of causes for historical 
events are mediated by thought (or rather language), to establish the influence of ideology on 
policymaking beyond the notional, requires the effects of ideological belief to be proven as a 
necessary cause; otherwise ideology is always reducible to another more primary cause.184 
Given the nature of the past, a tacit separation of the material and the ideal is given in realist 
historical ontology, a disparity that gives rise to “hard realities”, on the one hand, and “false 
consciousness”, on the other. 
In realist modes of explanation, this disparity is negotiated by the always already 
existing reality of international politics and the U.S. habit of pursuing high-minded ideals, 
which at times leads to realistic policies (more by chance than design) and at others some 
decidedly unrealistic ones. In the ‘Open Door’ framework, it is encoded into the internal 
contradictions of U.S. ideology itself: the promotion of values of liberty, democracy and self-
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determination are conflated with the economic imperatives of market capitalism and free 
trade, which work to undercut progress towards liberty and self-determination abroad.  
Given the tensions in any attempt to theorise causality, putting ideology somewhere 
(even if that is nowhere) becomes a necessary conceptual imperative within the explanatory 
framework; even more so, in the case of U.S. foreign policy where ideological representations 
abound. The procedure of realists and revisionists alike is to see ideological beliefs as “error”, 
and to recognise, if not the sincerity with which they are held then at least the power of the 
illusion they create. Both consider there to be an external reality which is objectively 
describable, hence explanation arises out the discrepancy between that ‘reality’ and U.S. 
policymaking, which necessitates the turning of beliefs erroneous, perceptions false and 
ideologies ironic in order to function.185 It is in the definition of that ‘reality’, structured by 
disparate ideological visions, that one finds the divergence between moderate realists and 
radical revisionists, though it may be said, that Williams was every bit as much the internal 
critic of American foreign policy as were realists.186  
Additionally, Williams’s definition of ideology as an all-embracing Weltanschauung 
is also important for understanding how his radical political vision emerges through his 
historical writings.187 In contrast to realists who seek to exclude ideas and ideology from the 
history of policymaking, Williams does not – to him ideology is historical reality. Reading 
him in this manner, Stephanson asserts: “The weltanschauung of expansionism is the 
American geist, the unifying principle that expresses itself in different ways in different times, 
as the social totality unfolds in history”.188 Williams presents us with an explanatory concept 
which hypostatises a single truth as the essence of reality. This epistemological position 
subverts the empiricist foundations of history, which seeks to establish the historical truth by 
making verifiable empirical statements drawn from the evidence. But Williams’s argument 
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cannot be disproved by reference to empirical evidence. Seen from this angle, Williams 
appears to be offering not simply history, but a philosophy of history; one that resolutely did 
not conform to the requirements of history as a disciplined form of knowledge. 
In contrast, the Weltanschauung of the open door was quiet in keeping with his 
recommendations for the transformation of American foreign policy and his radical vision of 
America. A prerequisite to that end was a redefinition of the American worldview. He urged 
fellow Americans “to cut to the bone and scrape the marrow of our traditional outlook” and 
embrace an “open door for revolutions”.189 This was not so much revolution in the Marxist 
tradition of a proletarian seizure of the means of production, but an adjustment in outlook that 
would “realize our most cherished ideals and aspirations”.190 The historical writings of 
Williams reflect a kind of dialectical idealism, where resolution (“transcendence of the tragic” 
as he called it) will emerge, not through changes in the material structures, but a change in the 
social totality as expressed in the Weltanschauung. Of course, the problem is how to know 
whether a change in the world-view has occurred, is occurring, or will occur. Williams offers 
us no criteria. 
In the field of U.S diplomatic history, the influence of Williams is widely apparent.191 
Yet it is also evident that the criticism levelled at his work has conditioned the way his ideas 
have been received and deployed. Bradford Perkins maintains that “it was equally possible 
simultaneously to embrace and to reject key parts of Williams’s argument”.192 The highly 
idiosyncratic nature of the interpretations of Williams, to be sure, meant that they could not be 
easily replicated. But the form in which they were represented did not lend them to simple 
adoption because to do so would only be to confirm the truth of the ‘Open Door’ thesis, not 
add to historical knowledge. The argument put forward here suggests that any utility gained 
from the writings of Williams presupposed their deconstruction, either into an economic 
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analyse or a focus on ideological aspects, in such a way as to ensure the that his utopian 
vision was separated and excluded from the field. 
 
V. Assimilation and Incorporation 
Initial resistance to the work of radical historians by representatives of historical 
establishment was emphatic: it was not history.193 If this was not always openly declared, it 
was implicit in the way mainstream critics went about addressing the arguments raised by 
revisionist historians. This involved some rather dubious tactics which sought not to engage in 
order to refute, but to dismiss and to marginalise. A popular stratagem was to label the Cold 
War revisionists as ‘presentist’ or partisan and to censure them of failing to uphold the 
profession’s objectivist creed of neutral, impartial and detached scholarship.194 More insidious 
was the use of the term ‘New Left’ to describe the entire revisionist camp, which only helped 
to trivialise and de-legitimise the revisionist critique. Peter Novick states: 
 
By aggregating a carefully selected list of writers – including the most vulnerable, and omitting the 
most circumspect – all cold war revisionists could be tarred with New Left brush, and made collectively 
responsible for whatever errors or exaggerations were contained in the work of anyone so designated.195 
 
In between the ad hominem attacks and the efforts at exclusion, however, more 
discerning readings of the revisionist literature were published, resulting in some serious and 
at times damaging criticism. Critics complained of narrow approaches that omitted political 
and strategic considerations, minimalised the role of the international system and lacked any 
sense of the vagaries of U.S decision-making. There were also charges that applied equally 
well to revisionism as to realism: ethnocentrism, parochialism, male-oriented, and elite 
focused.196  
If the revisionist critique was challenged, it too challenged the underlying precepts of 
traditional inquiry. Charles Maier writes “the non-revisionists are asking how policies are 
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formed and assume that this also covers the question why. The revisionists see the two 
questions as different and are interested in the why”.197 At the very least, Cold War 
revisionists forced traditional diplomatic historians to reconsider questions about the nature of 
American power and the interests it served. Nor could they pretend that policymaking was 
completely divorced from the rest of society. 
It is also important to remember, however, that revisionism did not challenge 
traditionalist modes of interpretation on every front. Although revisionists opposed the 
conventional understanding of historical objectivity, they remained “firmly committed to the 
realist, objectivist, and anti-relativist tradition of the left”.198 Moreover, whilst they reversed 
the theory of causation that belonged to orthodoxy, which traced the source of U.S. behaviour 
to the response to external Soviet aggression, revisionists never questioned the search for 
causal relationships. One revisionist insisted: “Attempts to isolate cause and effect must 
remain the ultimate goal”.199 Methodologically speaking, revisionists, realists and 
traditionalists alike continued to adhere to the empiricist formula for constructing accounts of 
the past, extracting meaning from the evidence and basing inquiry on “the search for an 
explanation of policy and the subject that produces it”.200 These are not insignificant concerns 
that ought to be borne in mind when considering how legitimacy was conferred upon Cold 
War revisionist accounts by the historical discipline.    
Unfortunately for the high priests of orthodoxy, efforts to bring down revisionism 
failed. Maddox’s attack on the professionalism of revisionist historians and implicitly on 
disciplinary integrity as a whole was condemned. Warren Kimball summed up the matter, 
stating “Maddox deals primarily with interpretations – not falsification of the evidence”.201 
No doubt such flagrant attempts to expunge the revisionist critique were not countenanced 
because they failed to prove their charges. Yet there was also the fact that the orthodox truth 
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of the Cold War, in the shadow of Vietnam, appeared so thoroughly discredited. Writing in 
1970, Maier admitted that “the war has eroded so many national self-conceptions that many 
assumptions behind traditional Cold War history have been cast into doubt”.202 Moreover, 
Schlesinger’s defence of orthodoxy in 1967 conceded important ground to revisionist 
arguments before he resurrected the ideological explanation that rested on Soviet depravity as 
means of exculpating American excesses.203  
This formula was repeated in John Lewis Gaddis’s The United States and the Origins 
of the Cold War (1972), which situated policymaking within the context of domestic politics. 
Examining the impact of public opinion and electoral politics on policymaking, Gaddis 
depicted Washington officials as badly constrained by such obstacles of the American 
political system, making the effective conduct of foreign policy difficult. Yet Gaddis’s 
narrative “frequently had more in common with revisionist than with orthodox accounts”.204 
He acknowledged that Soviet, not American, interests were at stake in Eastern Europe, that 
Stalin was cautious not expansionist and that U.S officials consistently exaggerated external 
threats to achieve politics ends. However, Gaddis concluded by affirming Soviet 
responsibility because Stalin’s “absolute power did give him more chance to surmount the 
internal restraints on his policy than were available to his democratic counterparts in the 
West”.205   
The acceptance of revisionist contentions within an overall framework that 
emphasised Soviet depravity and American virtue became a central feature of ‘post-
revisionist’ interpretations of the origins of the Cold War. In the words of Anders Stephanson, 
“post-revisionism can be seen as an attempt to come to terms with the revisionism while 
remaining within the political mainstream”.206 The possibility of a new interpretation of the 
Cold War, more acceptable to the self-image of the United States,  would emerge was not 
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unlikely given that the liberal consensus in American politics survived the crises of the late 
1960s and early 1970s, as American foreign policy moved into calmer waters during the era 
of détente with the Russians and the Chinese. Indeed, the incorporation of several key 
revisionist arguments into the reconstructed liberal realist narrative of the Cold War indicated 
the final assimilation of left revisionism as a part of the field. 
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Conclusion 
Neorealism, Revisionism and the “Containment of Ideology” 
By the end of the 1970s, the furore that had began with the revisionist critique of Cold War 
orthodoxy had abated. The cooling of scholarly passions was assisted by intertwined 
developments from within and without the discipline. Withdrawal from Vietnam coupled with 
new geopolitical configurations meant that Washington was forced to confront the limits of 
power in the international realm, which recast America’s role in the world and ushered in a 
period of détente with the Soviet Union. No longer centre stage, though still vital, the bipolar 
receded from view as new vistas lurking in the shadows of superpower confrontation moved 
into sight. The effects could be registered on historiographical trends. Joan Hoff-Wilson 
writes “diplomatic scholars began to turn their attention from global, political, and bipolar 
topics to regional, economic, cultural and multipolar ones”.207 In addition to alleviating 
concerns about the health and well-being of the discipline, these new avenues of inquiry 
helped to overcome the disciplinary stasis that had taken root for a time in the stand off 
between orthodoxy (and their traditional realist counterparts) and revisionism over the nature 
of American expansionism in the twentieth century and, in particular, during the Cold War.208 
That transcendence did not mark reconciliation so much as “an acceptance of 
perspectival relativism” as Novick describes it.209 On balance, such an outcome was probably 
a mixed blessing. Revisionist and revisionist-oriented scholars, though in the minority 
amongst their fellow diplomatic historians, were firmly ensconced in the mainstream dialogue 
over the nature of U.S diplomatic history and the Cold War and some could claim leading 
positions within the discipline. Yet the hope that revisionism would ‘stick’ never came 
fruition, as the disquieting conclusions reach by Williams and Kolko were succeeded by the 
less radical and iconoclastic, but more complex and conceptually refined arguments of the 
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‘corporatist’ and ‘world-systems’ interpretations.210 They analysed precisely what was 
missing or had been bypassed in the formulation of the ‘Open Door’ framework, focussing 
more critically on both domestic and international structures and the relationship between the 
two realms. Historiographical progress no doubt. But what was presupposed in replacing old 
categories of analysis with these new strategies and departures?  
Serious critics of the ‘Open Door’ had challenged its narrowness of scope, the 
privileged status accorded economic interests in defining a Weltanschauung, a focus on 
structural determinants, or the non-falsifiable explanatory schema. Such conceptual 
deficiencies inscribed ideological meaning into Williams’ radical representations of the 
American past. The form of explanation was the very thing that articulated the radical 
critique, so its revision – through corporatism and world systems – constituted something of a 
mediation away from radicalism. This is not to say, however, that we ought to prefer 
representations of the past that convey ideological meaning in a conceptually defunct manner. 
Rather it is to say that, there is a tension between a pursuit of a more ‘objective’ picture of the 
past and the mediation of ideological commitments one must accept in order to pursue that 
endeavour.  
The focus on the ‘revising’ of Cold War revisionism in this manner may appear 
counter-intuitive. If anything, revisionists have slammed post-revisionist efforts to revise the 
origins of the Cold War by resuscitating the orthodox thesis and thereby marginalising or 
‘containing’ the revisionist critique.211 This charge multiplied over time as post-revisionism 
mutated into a neorealist interpretation that has fused revisionist arguments within an overall 
framework more compatible with U.S. self-image. “The characteristic method of post-
revisionism in dealing with revisionist arguments”, writes Steven Hurst, “is a ‘yes, but’ 
formula that consists of accepting the broad contentions of the revisionists but reinterpreting 
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their meaning and implication in such a way as to neutralise their conclusions”.212 This has 
been achieved in several ways.  
First, post-revisionists have revived the realist chain of causation albeit in modified 
form. Michael Hogan states: “According to orthodox theory, the Soviets acted, the Americans 
reacted; according to neorealist theory, Americans reacted to the perception of how the 
Soviets acted”.213 Second, they have asserted the primacy of geopolitics over economics as 
the principal motivating factor behind U.S. Cold War foreign policy. Melvyn Leffler contends 
that “economic interests often reinforced geostrategic imperatives and ideological 
predilections” and “concerns about correlations of power… far exceeded… apprehensions 
about the well-being of the American economy”.214 Third, the explanation of U.S. 
expansionism and the rise of an American Empire have been reconfigured in a more virtuous 
light. Gaddis argues that the American Empire “fits more closely the model of defensive 
rather offensive expansion, of invitation rather than imposition, of improvisation rather than 
careful planning”. Finally, post-revisionists have downplayed the role of ideological factors. 
“Neorealism”, writes Stephanson “is a discourse that sets itself the profoundly ideological 
task of ridding history, in particular the history of policymaking, of ideology [emphasis in 
original]”.215 
Neorealism represents the containment of ideology because it supports certain forms 
of explanation and not others. This also true of the field as a whole; the drive to extinguish 
ideology is encoded into its institutional and discursive practices, which legitimates it as a 
form of knowledge. By virtue of the fact that the state and policymaking remain the central 
objects of investigation privileges a particular conception of explanation and ideology. It is no 
coincidence that the politics of the middle-ground, of the status quo, as expounded by 
established political authority, can insist upon the eradication of ideology. We can also say 
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that the production of knowledge based on the belief in a past reality (the “ideology of 
realism”) “lends itself to use by some forms of ideology better than to others”.216 The 
ideological positioned nature of historical knowledge is summarised by Hayden White: 
 
For subordinant, emergent, or resisting social groups, this recommendation, that they view history with 
the kind of “objectivity”, “modesty”, “realism”, and “social responsibility” that has characterised 
historical studies since its establishment as a professional discipline, can only appear as another aspect 
of the ideology they are indentured to oppose.217 
 
In other words, radical interpretations are always confronted by inauspicious terrain from 
which to elucidate the critique of dominant modes of historiography by virtue of the fact that 
the practices and procedures which define the historical discipline circumscribe the form, or 
the medium of explanation. The ‘disciplinisation’ of revisionism, therefore, the act of turning 
it into historical knowledge, constitutes the containment of the meaning and ideology of the 
radical critique. In many respects, it is gives a historiographical twist to Nietzsche’s maxim 
that “the state never has any use for truth as such, but only for truth which is useful to it”.218  
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